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PRIVATE CONTROL OVER ACCESS TO THE LAW: THE
PERPLEXING FEDERAL REGULATORY USE OF
PRIVATE STANDARDS
Nina A. Mendelson*
To save resources and build on private expertise, federal agencies have incor-
porated privately drafted standards into thousands of federal regulations—but
only by “reference.” These standards range widely, subsuming safety, benefits,
and testing standards. An individual who seeks access to this binding law gen-
erally cannot freely read it online or in a governmental depository library, as
she can the U.S. Code or the Code of Federal Regulations. Instead, she gener-
ally must pay a significant fee to the drafting organization, or else she must
travel to Washington, D.C., to the Office of the Federal Register’s reading
room.
This law, under largely private control, is not formally “secret,” but it is ex-
pensive and difficult to find. It raises the question of what underlies the intui-
tion that law, in a democracy, needs to be readily, publicly available. Previous
analyses of the need for publicity have focused almost wholly on the need of
regulated entities for notice of their obligations. This Article assesses several
other considerations, including notice to regulatory beneficiaries, such as
Medicare recipients, consumers of dangerous products, and neighbors of natu-
ral gas pipelines. Ready public access to the law is also critical to ensuring that
federal agencies are meaningfully accountable for their decisions, through both
internal and external mechanisms, including voting, political oversight, and
agency procedures. The need for ready public access is at least as strong in this
collaborative governance setting as when agencies act alone. Finally, expressive
harm—a message inconsistent with core democratic values—is likely to flow
from governmental adoption of regulatory law that is, in contrast to American
law in general, harder to find and costly to access. Full assessment of the im-
portance of public access to law both strengthens the case for reform of access
barriers to incorporated-by-reference rules and limits the range of acceptable
reform measures.
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Introduction
The American democratic commitment to public law is longstanding.
As James Madison wrote in 1822, “A popular Government, without popular
information . . . is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both.”1 And Justice Scalia echoed these sentiments nearly two centuries later:
“Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the
means of knowing what it prescribes.”2 Scalia contrasted the “nasty prac-
tice[ ]” of an early Roman emperor.3 Emperor Caligula reportedly faced
public outcry after he enacted laws imposing severe penalties and had them
inscribed in “exceedingly small letters on a tablet which he then hung up in
a high place, so that . . . many through ignorance . . . should lay themselves
liable to the penalties provided.”4
And in the 1930s, Harvard professor Erwin Griswold complained about
the enormous numbers of federal regulations, freshly issued by New Deal
agencies, that were obscurely published in “separate paper pamphlets” or
even on a “single sheet of paper.”5 Finding these binding legal rules was
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 The Writings of
James Madison 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
2. Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1179 (1989); see also Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 Wm.
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 497, 497 (2013) (quoting World Legal Info. Inst., http://www.worldlii.
org/worldlii/declaration/montreal_en.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2013)).
3. Scalia, supra note 2, at 1179 (misidentifying the emperor as Nero).
4. See Cassius Dio, Roman History 357 (Earnest Cary trans., Harvard Univ. Press,
1914–1927), available at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/
59*.html, cited in William Blackstone, Commentaries *46.
5. Erwin Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better Publication of
Executive Legislation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 294 (1934). Griswold suggests that the total
amount of “law” issued during the first year of the National Recovery Administration exceeded
10,000 pages, “scattered among 5991 press releases during this period.” Id. at 199. These laws
included hundreds of “industry” codes drafted under the auspices of the National Industrial
Recovery Act. See Mila Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 Duke L.J. 1169, 1179 (2013).
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difficult, leading to “chaos” and an “intolerable” situation.6 Congress re-
sponded, requiring that agencies publish all rules in the Federal Register and
in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”).7 Currently, recent federal pub-
lic laws, the U.S. Code, the Federal Register, and the CFR are all freely availa-
ble online as well as in governmental depositary libraries.8
Despite these repeated public commitments to transparency, we seem to
be returning to a situation where thousands of federal regulatory standards
are increasingly difficult to locate. The text of these standards appears in
neither the Federal Register nor the CFR. They are privately drafted stan-
dards that a federal agency has incorporated only by “reference” into the
CFR, and they are generally available only on request to a private organiza-
tion and payment of a nontrivial price.
The CFR today contains nearly 9,500 “incorporations by reference” of
standards, often referred to as “IBR” rules or standards. Some IBR rules
incorporate material published by other agencies or state entities,9 but many
incorporate privately drafted standards from so-called “standards develop-
ment organizations” or “SDOs,” organizations ranging from the American
Society for Testing and Materials (“ASTM”) to the Society for Automotive
Engineers and the American Petroleum Institute (“API”).10 Agency use of
private standards is likely to grow because, since the 1990s, both executive
branch and congressional policies have officially encouraged it. Indeed, if an
6. Griswold, supra note 5, at 204 (“chaos”); id. at 205 (“intolerable”).
7. Note, The Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations—A Reappraisal, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 439, 440–41 (1966); see also Griswold, supra note 5, at 205.
8. E.g., Thomas, Library of Cong., http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Sept. 29, 2013)
(access to legislative materials); Opinions, Supreme Court of the U.S., http://www.
supremecourt.gov/opinions/opinions.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (Supreme Court opin-
ions before 1882 and after 1991); Federal Digital System, U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (providing access, back to the mid-1990s, to
the CFR, Federal Register, public and private laws, U.S. Code, and some federal court opin-
ions). Private services, such as West Publishing, also provide access for a price, although their
assertion of copyright depends on supplying added content, such as West’s headnotes system.
Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 647 (1888). Federal court opinions are also freely available
online. E.g., PACER, http://www.pacer.gov (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (free access to federal
judicial opinions; per-page charges for access to other court materials); Supreme Court of
the U.S., supra, (Supreme Court opinions); U.S. Gov’t & Printing Office, supra, (access to
some federal court opinions); see also Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, PACER (Apr. 1,
2013), http://www.pacer.gov/documents/epa_feesched.pdf. PACER’s imposition of fees for
electronic access has been criticized. See infra text accompanying note 342.
9. E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 802.0 (2013) (incorporating National Institute of Standards and
Technology Handbook 44 on weighing and measuring devices); 40 C.F.R. § 52.742(d) (2012)
(incorporating provisions of Illinois Administrative Code). Some materials incorporated by
reference include documents too voluminous to reprint, such as the Post Office manual with
zip codes, incorporated by reference in its rulemaking on the “ZIP + 4” nine-digit zip code.
See Amendments to ZIP Code Provisions to Explain the ZIP + 4 Code, 46 Fed. Reg. 33,249,
33,252 (June 29, 1981).
10. Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 131, 150 (2013) (stating that the database included 9,475 incorporations by
reference of standards in 2012 and listing the top ten suppliers of private IBR standards).
740 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:737
agency develops “government-unique” standards when a “consensus” pri-
vate standard exists, the agency must explain why it did so.11
A reader perusing worker-safety requirements in the CFR may note that
contractors handling pressure systems must comply with the American Soci-
ety for Mechanical Engineers (“ASME”)’s “Manual for Determining Re-
maining Strength of Corroded Pipelines,”12 among other standards. To
access these standards, the CFR refers the reader directly to the ASME at its
New Jersey location or at its website.13 The reader’s only alternative is to
write for an appointment at the Office of the Federal Register (“OFR”)’s
reading room in downtown Washington, D.C.14 On the internet, the cited
standard is available from a third-party seller for $68; despite the CFR’s
promise, ASME itself apparently no longer provides the standard.15
Private standards like these are used to define the content of federal
rules in an extraordinarily wide variety of subject areas, ranging from toy
safety to Medicare prescription-drug-dispensing requirements to nuclear
power plant operation.16 Some IBR standards might be colloquially charac-
terized as “technical,” including those establishing standard-measurement
protocols17 or coordination-type standards. Coordination standards include,
for example, the National Fire Protection Association’s “standard coupling”
compatibility standard, developed around 1910 to ensure that fire hoses can
be properly attached to fire hydrants, no matter the city of the originating
11. See infra text accompanying notes 60–64 (discussing Circular No. A-119 and Na-
tional Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995); see also infra notes 66–70 (the OFR
is proposing to reduce restrictions on agency incorporations by reference).
12. 10 C.F.R. pt. 851, App. A, sec. 4(b)(2)(x) (2013).
13. See id. § 851.27(a)(2)(vi).
14. The CFR notes that a reader may contact the National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration to view IBR standards and provides a phone number and website. Id.
§ 851.27(a)(2)(i). As of May 2013, the reader is automatically referred to Code of Federal Regu-
lations, Nat’l Archives, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/index.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2013). At that website, if one clicks on “incorporation by reference” in the left-hand
margin, one is referred to another page containing instructions for making an appointment at
the OFR’s Washington, D.C., location. Incorporation by Reference, Nat’l Archives, http://
www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
15. Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength of Corroded Pipelines, Techstreet
Store, http://www.techstreet.com/products/1842873 (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). The cited
version of the standard, from 1991, no longer appears to be directly available from ASME. See
Standards, Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, http://www.asme.org/shop/standards?cm_re=Home-
_-GlobalHeader-_-Standards#searchBy=Manual%20for%20Determining%20the%20Remain-
ing%20Strength%20of%20Corroded%20Pipelines (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
16. 10 C.F.R. § 34.20(a)(1) (2013) (incorporating American National Standards Insti-
tute (“ANSI”) performance standards for industrial radiography equipment); 16 C.F.R.
§§ 1505.5–.6 (2013) (incorporating ANSI and National Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”)
requirements for electrically operated toys, including toys with heating elements); 42 C.F.R.
§ 423.160(b)(2) (2012) (incorporating National Council for Prescription Drug Programs
SCRIPT Standard).
17. E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1728.98(a)(2) (2013) (incorporating Rural Electrification Adminis-
tration and Rural Utilities Service requirements for “Pole Top Pins”); 40 C.F.R. § 52.741(a)(3)
(2012) (incorporating ASTM vapor pressure measurement methods to define “heavy liquid”).
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fire truck.18 Even coordination standards are not policy-neutral, since they
can clearly affect industry structure and market prices.19
But agencies also expressly use IBR standards to define policy, including
substantive standards for health and safety.20 For example, federal rules re-
quire employers who hire teenagers to load scrap paper into balers, a partic-
ularly hazardous occupation for minors in the Department of Labor’s view,
to ensure that the machines conform to incorporated-by-reference American
National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) safety standards.21 The relevant stan-
dards are no longer available from ANSI at all but can be purchased from a
third-party seller for $50.40; ANSI’s revision costs $150.22 Other private
18. See Tyler R.T. Wolf, Note, Existing in a Legal Limbo: The Precarious Legal Position of
Standards-Development Organizations, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 807, 808–09 & n.11 (2008)
(describing the challenges of fighting fires prior to the development of uniform standards
based on a plan of the NFPA).
19. E.g., Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Develop-
ment of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 1329, 1373
(1978) (suggesting that some SDO standards were chosen to maximize the competitive advan-
tage of one segment of industry over another); see also Comment of the Modification & Re-
placement Parts Ass’n 14 (OFR Docket June 1, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?objectId=09000064810266b8&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
(“Standard-setting organizations or companies may attempt to lock out their competitors via
incorporated standards that restrict processes or allowable materials or practices.”).
This and several other comments cited throughout this Article come from an OFR online
docket of public comments. Comments were filed in response to the OFR’s request for com-
ments on a petition seeking revision of incorporation by reference rules. (I am a signatory to
the petition.) See infra text accompanying note 39 (describing petition). The OFR’s request for
comments appears at Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,414 (announcement of peti-
tion for rulemaking and request for comments, Feb. 27, 2012), available at https://www.federal
register.gov/articles/2012/02/27/2012-4399/incorporation-by-reference (reprinting petition);
Docket Folder Summary, regulations.gov, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=
NARA-12-0002 (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
20. E.g., 10 C.F.R. § 851.23(a)(9) (2013) (requiring contractors to comply with the fol-
lowing “safety and health” standards, incorporating by reference the 2005 American Confer-
ence of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (“ACGIH”)’s “Threshold Limit Values for
Chemical Substances and Physical Agents and Biological Exposure Indices”). Note that these
limits now appear to be unavailable on the ACGIH website. See ACGIH, http://www.acgih.org
(last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
21. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 570.63(a) (2012) (finding operation of paper products machines to
be “particularly hazardous for the employment of minors”); 29 C.F.R. § 570.63(c)(1) (2012)
(nonetheless permitting sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to load scrap paper balers that com-
ply with specified “industry safety standard,” ANSI Standard Z245.5-2008 or earlier).
22. ANSI Z245.5-2008, Techstreet Store, http://www.techstreet.com/products/
1577288 (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). ANSI sells the 2013 version of the standard for $150. See
eStandards Store, ANSI, http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=ANSI+Z245.5-2013
(last visited Jan. 9, 2013). For another example, federal rules require a natural gas pipeline
operator to implement a public awareness program according to the requirements of an API
standard. 49 C.F.R. § 192.616 (2012) (incorporating API Recommended Practice 1162). That
standard currently costs $124. API RP 1162, Techstreet Store, http://www.techstreet.com/
products/1757546 (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). As of April 2013, the API had made this stan-
dard available for free on a read-only basis, although access required the reader to waive any
challenges to the API’s copyright and acknowledge the API’s ability to set a price or revoke
access at any time. See infra note 33. To the API and the Transportation Department’s credit,
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standards are incorporated as an acceptable, although not exclusive, means
of compliance with federal standards.23
And private standards can also define the extent of available federal ben-
efits. For example, Medicare Part D standards permit some coverage of
pharmaceuticals dispensed for off-label uses, but only if the drug is listed as
medically indicated in one of three private drug compendia.24 As the API
recently wrote in public comments, IBR standards can include “politically
contentious permitting regulations that affect almost every industry.”25
Meanwhile, although the Federal Register Act, as amended by the Free-
dom of Information Act (“FOIA”), broadly requires agencies to publish in
the Federal Register “substantive rules of general applicability adopted as
authorized by law,”26 it includes an exception: “[M]atter reasonably available
to the class of persons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal
Register when incorporated by reference therein with the approval of the
Director of the Federal Register.”27 The original idea behind this exception
to Federal Register publication was to permit the government to save print-
ing costs by allowing agencies to incorporate voluminous material published
elsewhere,28 such as rules freely available from other federal agencies or state
agencies.
however, as of November 2013, a read-only copy of the standard can be accessed through a live
link on the Department of Transportation’s website. See Public Awareness Programs: API RP
1162, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/PublicAwareness/
PARPI1162.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
23. For example, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) standards
for the storage and handling of anhydrous ammonia permit fertilizer storage systems to be
installed in compliance with either ANSI or Fertilizer Institute standards. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.111(b)(1)(i) (2012). Federal accessibility requirements under fair housing laws provide
a “safe harbor” if the housing complies with standards set by ANSI. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(4)
(2006). As of August 2013, ANSI Standard 117.1, referenced in the law, cost $40. eStandards
Store: ANSI A117.1-1986, Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.
aspx?sku=ANSI+A117.1-1986 (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
24. HHS rules limit Medicare Part D coverage for a drug that is prescribed for a “medi-
cally accepted indication,” 42 C.F.R. § 423.100 (2012), defining that term with reference to
three drug compendia mentioned in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(6), (g)(1)(B)(i)
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (listing “American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information,”
“United States Pharmacopeia-Drug Information,” and “the DRUGDEX Information System”).
District courts have disagreed about whether the agency’s limiting construction violates the
statute, which authorizes coverage for “medically accepted indications,” “including” the exam-
ples provided in the statute. See, e.g., Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Nievod v. Sebellius [sic], No. C11-4134 SBA, 2013 WL 503089 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013).
25. Comment of David Miller, Director, Am. Petroleum Inst. 4 (OFR Docket June 1,
2012) [hereinafter Comment of Am. Petroleum Inst.], available at http://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?objectId=0900006481025c0c&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
(arguing that the OFR should have no role in requiring free public access to IBR rules).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2012).
27. Id. § 552(a)(1).
28. See Bremer, supra note 10, at 142. As others have pointed out, with the advent of
widespread internet access to the CFR and the Federal Register, the concern about printing
costs has largely evaporated. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 523–24.
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In the case of privately developed, but incorporated, standards, however,
the agency generally refers the reading public to the SDO.29 SDOs have,
seemingly without exception, asserted copyright protection and an entitle-
ment to charge a “purchase price” for access. Even when they provide some
free, read-only access to the public, SDOs generally claim the option to re-
voke access or to charge for it.30 Again, the reader’s alternative is to make an
appointment at the OFR’s reading room in Washington, D.C. The reading
room contains no photocopier.31
The payments that SDOs require typically significantly exceed the trans-
action costs of making a standard available, such as the copying costs.32
Many SDOs have stated that the fees they charge for standards purchases
represent compensation for value and a source of income that helps pay for
the development of the standards.33 Prices that SDOs charge for a variety of
29. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 192.7(c) (2010) (listing SDOs).
30. As of August 2013, ASTM International (formerly the ASTM) has opened a read-
only reading room, purportedly for standards that have been incorporated into federal law.
Reading Room, ASTM Int’l, http://www.astm.org/READINGLIBRARY/index.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2013) (“This is a free service where you can view and read ASTM safety standards
incorporated in United States regulations.”). However, the coverage is spotty at best; searches
in January 2013 revealed that the library appeared to exclude numerous ASTM standards in-
corporated by reference into federal regulations. Meanwhile, apart from granting a limited
license to read the standards, ASTM asks readers to waive any challenges to its holding a full
copyright, including a bar on “in any way exploit[ing]” the material “in whole or in part.” Cf.
ASTM License Agreement, ASTM Int’l, available at http://www.astm.org/COPYRIGHT/Sin-
gle_PDF_copyrightlicense_agreement.doc (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (version as of Jan. 30,
2013, on file with author). As of this writing, API has also made some limited, read-only, free
public access available to its federally cited standards, but it requires readers to sign an agree-
ment “acknowledg[ing] that the content of the Online Document is copyrighted and owned by
API and is protected by U.S. copyright law . . . .” and reserving API’s rights to “suspend or
discontinue providing the Online Document to you with or without cause and without no-
tice.” Government-Cited and Safety Documents, API, http://publications.api.org/GocCited_Dis-
claimer.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). Research has identified the rare organization that
does not charge for access to its standards, although the standards do include copyright no-
tices. E.g., Snell Mem’l Found., 1995 Standard for Protective Headgear (rev. 1998),
available at http://www.smf.org/standards/pdf/b95rev.pdf (incorporated in 16 C.F.R
§ 1203.53(a) (2013)).
31. Incorporation by Reference, Nat’l Archives, supra note 14. Standards are occasion-
ally made available for inspection in agency regional offices. For example, the Department of
Transportation also maintains a set of privately incorporated standards for inspection in its
Washington, D.C., Office of Pipeline Safety. 49 C.F.R. § 192.7(b) (2012).
32. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2012) (stating that under the FOIA, agencies may
charge requesters transaction costs such as photocopying).
33. E.g., Comment of Am. Nat’l Standards Inst. 2 (OFR Docket May 31, 2012), available
at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006481023751&disposition=at-
tachment&contentType=pdf; Comment of Eric P. Loewen, President, Am. Nuclear Soc’y 2
(OFR Docket Mar. 28, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?object
Id=0900006480fe4421&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (“[O]ur staff, the editors,
printing, and meeting room charges at hotels are not free during the development of stan-
dards, and so therefore it is not sustainable to provide industry standards for ‘free.’ ”); Com-
ment of Jim Shannon, President, Nat’l Fire Protection Ass’n 1–2 (OFR Docket June 1, 2012),
744 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:737
IBR standards range from fifty to several thousand dollars for the prescrip-
tion drug compendia incorporated in Medicare rules. The least expensive of
these compendia costs $349, and one reportedly costs $6,000.34
Under the relevant statute, the OFR must approve an agency’s request to
incorporate by reference, rather than publishing in the Federal Register.35 To
date, however, the OFR has not publicly disclosed the extent to which it
considers access charges in deciding whether a standard is “reasonably avail-
able to the class of persons affected thereby” within the meaning of the stat-
ute and thus suitable for an agency to incorporate in the Code of Federal
Regulations only by “reference.”36 Quite obviously, many of these standards
will be financially out of reach for significant numbers of individuals and
small businesses.
This issue is currently receiving significant attention with an eye to re-
form. In December 2011, the Administrative Conference of the United States
issued a tepid recommendation, acknowledging the public access problem,37
but recommending only that agencies try to “promote the availability of the
available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006481025752&dispo-
sition=attachment&contentType=pdf (arguing that the development of “quality standards” re-
quires resources to coordinate volunteers, to provide technical staff assistance, research, and
editing, and to prepare standards for publication).
34. E.g., AHFS Drug Information 2013, ASHP Store, http://store.ashp.org/Default.aspx?
TabID=216&ProductId=40143356 (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (selling the American Hospital
Formulary Service Drug Information 2013 at $349, or at $295 for “members”); USP-NF, U.S.
Pharmacopeial Convention, http://store.usp.org/OA_HTML/usp2_ibeCCtpSctDspRte.jsp?
section=10071&minisite=10020 (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (pricing U.S. Pharmacopeia Na-
tional Formulary standard at $850 each); Comment of Jacob Speidel, Staff Att’y, Senior Citi-
zens Law Project, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc. 2 (OFR Docket June 21, 2012) [hereinafter
Comment of Vermont Legal Aid], available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?
objectId=09000064810258aa&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (reporting Drugdex
price of $6,000). Another source states that Drugdex is not available for purchase by members
of the general public and that the publisher would not provide details of pricing. CMA Report:
Medicare Coverage for Off-Label Drug Use, Ctr. for Medicare Advocacy, Inc., http://www.
medicareadvocacy.org/InfoByTopic/PartDandPrescDrugs/10_09.16.OffLabelDrugCoverage.
htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (requiring Federal Register publication of substantive rules of
general applicability, procedural rules, interpretive rules of general applicability, and other
important agency documents but providing an exception for material “reasonably available to
the class of persons affected thereby” and incorporated “with the approval of the Director of
the Federal Register”).
36. One report suggests that the OFR primarily considers whether particular regulated
entities might find the cost of purchasing a standard to be “prohibitive.” Emily Schleicher
Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in Federal Regulations, Admin. Conf. of the U.S. 11 (Oct.
19, 2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Revised-Draft-IBR-Report-10-
19-11.pdf (“Federal publication requirements tacitly acknowledge this by limiting incorpora-
tion by reference to materials that are ‘reasonably available’ to regulated parties.”).
37. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2011-5: Incorporation by Refer-
ence 2 (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Recommendation-2011-5-
Incorporation-by-Reference_0.pdf (noting also that increasing transparency “may conflict
with copyright law” and “the significant value” of the private standards). I presently serve as a
public member of the Administrative Conference.
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materials while respecting the copyright owner’s interest.”38 In early 2012, a
group of law professors led by Columbia law professor Peter Strauss, and
including myself, petitioned the OFR to revise its rules for incorporating by
reference and to approve IBR rules only if free read-only access were pro-
vided to the public.39
Shortly before this Article went to press, the OFR, after taking comment
on the petition,40 agreed to revise the rule, although the proposed rule, is-
sued in October 2013, falls far short of what the petition requested.41 The
Notice of Proposed Rule still does not address the meaning of the statutory
“reasonably available” requirement, proposing instead simply to reiterate the
requirement in its rules42 and to ask agencies to discuss their efforts to make
the materials available.43 Meanwhile, the proposed rule would also liberalize
when agencies could incorporate outside material.44
The issue has received scholarly attention as well. A number of com-
mentators have stressed the value SDOs can contribute to the federal regula-
tory process45 and have assessed whether SDOs possess legitimate copyright
claims in the standards, once agencies incorporate them into federal rules.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,414 (announcement of petition and
request for comments, Feb. 27, 2012), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/
2012/02/27/2012-4399/incorporation-by-reference (reprinting petition). I also contributed
substantially to the American Bar Association Administrative Law Section comments on the
petition. Comment of Michael Herz, Sec. Chair, Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice,
Am. Bar Ass’n (OFR Docket June 1, 2012) [hereinafter Comment of ABA Admin. Law Sec-
tion], available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006481025ea5&
disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
40. Id. The Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) has also solicited comments on
Circular No. A-119, although as of the date of writing, it has not yet announced any revisions.
See Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and
in Conformity Assessment Activities, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,357 (Mar. 30, 2012).
41. Incorporation by Reference, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,797 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013).
42. See id. (proposing revised 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a)(3), which reiterates statutory
requirement).
43. Id. (proposing revised 1 C.F.R. § 51.5(a)). The proposed rule would also ask the
agency to “summarize the material” proposed for incorporation, an improvement over current
approaches. Id.
44. The OFR is proposing to expand the scope of materials that are eligible for incorpo-
ration by reference to include any “reasonably available” materials that would “substantially
reduce[ ] the volume of material published in the Federal Register” or would consist of “data,
criteria, standards, specifications, techniques, illustrations, or similar material.” See id. (pro-
posing revised 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a)(2)). Under current rules, proposed IBR material must satisfy
both these requirements as well as the “reasonabl[e] availabil[ity]” requirement. See 1 C.F.R.
§ 51.7 (2013).
45. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright,
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 291, 334 (2005); Hamilton, supra
note 19, at 1446–47; Strauss, supra note 2, at 499–500. Public comments filed in response to
the OFR’s request for comments have stressed this same point. See, e.g., Comment of Rae
McQuade, President, N. Am. Energy Standards Bd. 4 (OFR Docket May 31, 2012) [hereinafter
Comment of N. Am. Energy Standards Bd.], available at http://www.regulations.gov/content
Streamer?objectId=0900006481024904&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (“[SDOs]
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The possibility that the “merger” doctrine could eliminate such claims, for
example, has been hotly debated.46 And using SDO standards likely reduces
demands on agency budgets, although it does so largely by shifting the cost
of developing standards to those who wish to read them.
Emily Bremer argues that although incorporation by reference “impedes
access to the law,” agencies should continue, in view of the value of SDO
standards, to incorporate and rely on copyrighted standards, if perhaps
more thoughtfully.47 Professors Strauss and Cunningham argue for signifi-
cantly greater public access, acknowledging that charging for standards in-
terferes with the “kinds of activities American[ ]administrative law has long
committed to fully open public notice and participation,”48 although Strauss
suggests a class of incorporated materials for which SDOs might still be per-
mitted to charge access fees to defray revenue losses on other IBR
standards.49
Whether SDOs continue to possess a valid copyright in standards that a
federal agency incorporates by reference is surely an important question that
may, among other things, affect the price an agency would have to pay for
public access to the standard. And SDOs unquestionably contribute services
of value to the regulatory process by crafting standards that agencies wish to
incorporate.
In my view, however, the discussion to date has not fully ventilated the
central question of why we need law to be meaningfully accessible to the
. . . perform a valuable societal function that otherwise would have to be done by regulatory
bodies . . . .”).
46. See, e.g., Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (“[N]o copyright could . . .
be secured in the products of the labor done by judicial officers in the discharge of their
judicial duties.”); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l., Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (“[W]e read Banks, Wheaton, and related cases consistently to enunciate the princi-
ple that ‘the law,’ whether it has its source in judicial opinions or statutes, ordinances or
regulations, is not subject to federal copyright law.”); CCC Info. Servs. v. MacLean Hunter
Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that private organizations retained
copyright in standards referenced by state insurance law); Bremer, supra note 10, at 170–72;
Robert Kry, Case Note, The Copyright Law, 111 Yale L.J. 761, 763–66 (2001); Strauss, supra
note 2, at 560 (suggesting that although SDO copyright in voluntary standards is “uncon-
troversial[ ],” once they are incorporated, “the proposition that law is not subject to copyright
rears its head”). The U.S. solicitor general has taken the position that the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Veeck was correct. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, S. Bldg. Code Cong.
Int’l, Inc. v. Veeck (2003) (No. 02-355), at 13, available at http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/
2002/2pet/6invit/2002-0355.pet.ami.inv.pdf (arguing that the Fifth Circuit correctly reasoned
that binding law cannot be subject to copyright limitations).
In addition, an SDO’s extensive overcharging for an IBR standard might supply a pur-
ported copyright infringer with a defense of copyright misuse. See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info.
Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520–21 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing copyright misuse
defense); Lasercomb Am., Inc., v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 971, 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
47. Bremer, supra note 10, at 153–54; see also Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1458 (arguing
simply that agencies incorporating standards should provide contact information for the SDO
and place copies of the referenced standard in their public reading rooms).
48. Strauss, supra note 2, at 542; see also Cunningham, supra note 45, at 334.
49. Strauss, supra note 2, at 549–53. See generally Hamilton, supra note 19, 1446–47
(discussing the value of SDOs in helping to develop standards).
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public. This law is not secret. But it is far less publicly accessible than the
U.S. Code, the Code of Federal Regulations, or judicial opinions. It is costly
to view and often difficult to find. And these barriers may preclude many
from reading it. This setting ought to prompt consideration of the reasons
or principles underlying our intuition that law, in a democracy, must be
easily accessible to citizens.50
Accordingly, I put the copyright and value questions to one side and
instead attempt to focus on the reasons why and the extent to which law,
including regulatory law, needs to be meaningfully available to the public.
Clearly, public access to binding law—even to so-called “technical” stan-
dards—is needed to provide notice to those who must comply. This concern
has been incorporated into constitutional due process doctrine.51 And re-
quiring that governmental decisions generally be public facilitates accounta-
bility for these decisions; the “threat of exposure” encourages officials to
make decisions only for public-interested reasons.52
But these are only initial responses regarding the reasons for and the
needed extent of public access. As I discuss in detail below, access to the law
needs to be widespread for several other reasons. For example, regulatory
beneficiaries need notice, since they are affected by and may make choices
based on the content of the standards. And law needs to be widely, publicly
accessible so that the public can invoke important mechanisms of accounta-
bility, including voting, contacting Congress, participating in agency proce-
dures, and seeking judicial review.
Ensuring the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms is more chal-
lenging in the IBR setting. IBR rules offer a significant example of so-called
“collaborative governance”—the public enlisting of private institutions and
resources in the process of governance. Despite other potential safeguards,
broad, meaningful public access to this body of regulatory law is critical to
ensuring that both the private institutions and the agencies that incorporate
50. See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 10, at 154 (“[I]f the material is copyrighted, reprinting
it in the text of the regulation may simply not be an option.”); Hamilton, supra note 19, at
1418 n.304 (noting only that having to purchase a standard from an SDO is “most inconve-
nient for the reader”); id. at 1458 (“[I]n many instances those covered may already be quite
familiar with the voluntary standard.”). Strauss does mention that a neighbor to a nuclear
power plant may wish for “assurance of its safety,” something that it could get through SDO
standards, supra note 2, at 502, and he comments on judicial doctrine that the standard, once
incorporated, may become “public property,” id. at 511. Finally, he quotes language from the
Montreal Declaration on Free Access to Law (2002), stating that free access to legal informa-
tion “promotes justice and the rule of law.” Id. at 497 (quoting World Legal Info. Inst.,
http://www.worldlii.org/worldlii/declaration/montreal_en.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2013));
see also Bremer, supra note 10, at 157 (“[T]he focus [of availability] should be broader, going
beyond regulated parties to include other interested parties . . . .” (emphasis added)).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 193–195.
52. E.g., Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the Warrant-
less Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 357, 389–404 (national security secrecy claims
interfered with accountability mechanisms). See generally Jeremy Bentham, An Essay on Politi-
cal Tactics, in 2 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 299, 310 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh,
William Tait 1843), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1921/113915 (publicity and the
threat of exposure “constrain the members of the assembly to perform their duty”).
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their work are properly accountable to all interested parties. Finally, agency
decisions to incorporate private standards into the law, when private groups
are permitted to and do charge significantly for access, represent a poten-
tially injurious public message that is inconsistent with core democratic
values.
Fully considering why law needs to be public and how public it needs to
be has significant implications. First, it strengthens the case for IBR reform;
ready public access, like the accessibility of the CFR, should be understood
to be a condition for incorporation. This in turn limits the range of reforms,
whether administrative or legislative, that should be considered acceptable.
Further, a clearer understanding of why law needs to be readily available to
the public could inform judicial interpretations of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.53 Individual agencies also
could change their incorporation practices.
Finally, assessing public access needs in the setting of agency use of pri-
vately drafted IBR rules also sheds some light on how we should think, more
generally, about the value of governmental transparency. Particularly for law
or regulations—which apply broadly, impose widespread obligations, and
generate benefits, and which can depend for their legitimacy on multiple
mechanisms of accountability—making law formally public may not be
enough. The law must be sufficiently public to serve notice and accountabil-
ity functions and to express a commitment to core democratic values. Part I
presents background on the use of private standards in federal rules and the
access charges the public must pay to read them. Part II analyzes the legal
and policy concerns that require federal rules to remain public, including
notice to all those affected and the accountability of governmental actors
and SDOs. Part III assesses some existing reform proposals and suggests
some other options that deserve fuller investigation. The Article concludes
with some observations on public access.
I. Incorporation by Reference of Private Standards
A. The Use and Costs of Privately Developed Standards
Since its enactment in 1966, FOIA has permitted the director of the
Federal Register to approve an agency’s “incorporation by reference” of ma-
terial published elsewhere into regulatory text without reprinting it in the
Federal Register.54 The material must be “reasonably available to the class of
persons affected thereby.”55 Beyond this requirement, Office of the Federal
Register regulations permit incorporation by reference of a publication only
if it “substantially reduces the volume of material published in the Federal
53. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012) (Freedom of Information Act); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012)
(Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking requirements).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012). This language was originally added to section 552(a) in
the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), and codified in the
U.S. Code by Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967).
55. Id.
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Register.”56 The publication must also consist of “published data, criteria,
standards, specifications, techniques, illustrations, or similar material.”57
Congress expected this material at least to be available in libraries.58
From time to time, Congress has specifically contemplated a federal
agency’s incorporation of private standards. For example, when Congress
passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and for two years after its
effective date, Congress authorized the newly created Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (“OSHA”) to adopt so-called “national consen-
sus standards” for worker safety and even provided an exemption from the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).59
In the mid-1990s, moreover, both Congress and the White House di-
rected agencies, where practicable, to utilize privately developed standards
rather than writing new “government-unique” standards. The Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”) issued Circular No. A-119 in 1982, most
recently revising it in 1998, directing agencies to rely on voluntary standards,
including industry standards or consensus codes, rather than “government-
unique standards.”60 The Circular even requires an agency to provide a writ-
ten explanation for issuing a government-unique standard if a consensus
standard exists.61 Agencies are also implicitly free to incorporate nonconsen-
sus private standards if they so choose.62 In Section 12(d) of the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (the “NTTAA”), Con-
gress provided that, unless inconsistent with law or impractical, all federal
agencies are to use “technical standards that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies . . . to carry out [the agencies’] policy
objectives or activities.”63 The NTTAA’s enactment responded to industry
and SDO concerns that Circular No. A-119 would not otherwise prompt
changes in agency behavior.64
56. 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a)(3) (2013).
57. Id.
58. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 519.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (2006).
60. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular No. A-119 Revised: Federal Participa-
tion in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Con-
formity Assessment Activities para. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Circular No. A-119], available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119.
61. Circular No. A-119, supra note 60, para. 6.
62. Id. para. 6(g).
63. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 § 12(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 272 note (2012). The Act broadly defines “[t]echnical standards” to mean “performance
based or design-specific technical specifications.” Id. § 12(d)(4). The Act also requires agencies
to transmit to OMB an “explanation of the reasons” for using government-unique standards
rather than voluntary consensus standards. Id. § 12(d)(3).
64. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-390, at 31 (1995) (“[The] Vice President of the Ameri-
can National Standards Institute (ANSI)[ ] stated that the Circular A-119 needs Congressional
backing to be effective.”); id. at 25 (“Adherence to OMB Circular A-119 is a matter of great
concern to industry and the Committee . . . .”).
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Both requirements assertedly were to reduce needless federal regulatory
duplication and complexity when private industry had already devised an
adequate voluntary standard. By using private standards, agencies could re-
duce demands on their own resources and take advantage of private sector
expertise.65
From the private side, some standards were drafted for other purposes,
without anticipating agency incorporation.66 On the other hand, some were
undoubtedly written with the hope—or the plan—of incorporation into
federal regulatory law.67 Indeed, governmental agencies may even financially
support private standards that are later incorporated by reference. Circular
No. A-119 contemplates that agencies may provide financial support to an
SDO to complete a standard, particularly when “its timely development . . .
appears unlikely in the absence of such support.”68 Finally, agency officials
may also participate in SDO deliberations.69
OFR rules do not require agencies to seek permission to incorporate
outside material by reference until just before the agency issues a final rule.70
APA rulemaking requirements more generally call for an agency to publish a
proposed rule and provide an opportunity for public comment before final-
izing the rule.71 Probably to facilitate this public comment, an agency will
also typically state in a proposed rule that it plans to incorporate private
material by reference. Unfortunately, the text the agency plans to incorpo-
rate is typically not included in the Federal Register. Instead, a putative pub-
lic commenter may also be referred to the private organization for the text of
the rule. For example, a December 2012 proposed rule issued by the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) for a hand-held infant carrier
safety standard proposed to incorporate ASTM International (formerly the
ASTM) Standard F2050-12. The proposed rule referred readers who wished
to comment to http://www.astm.org.72 This standard was only available at
the provided website for a price of $49.20.73
65. See Circular No. A-119, supra note 60, para. 2 (listing goals, including
“eliminat[ing] the cost to the Government of developing its own standards” and encouraging
“harmonization of standards”); see also Bremer, supra note 10, at 139–41 (listing reasons for
governmental agencies to rely on industry standards).
66. E.g., Strauss, supra note 2, at 546 (“[T]he ASME would in some sense be surprised
by the conversion of all or part of one of its voluntary standards into a legal obligation. . . .
[T]here could have been no bargained price, no prior contractual arrangement to develop the
standard.”).
67. Id. at 513.
68. Circular No. A-119, supra note 60, para. 7(b).
69. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 506 (“In Fiscal 2012, NIST reported, agency personnel
participated in 552 SDOs.”).
70. 1 C.F.R. § 51.5(a)(1) (2013).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).
72. See Safety Standard for Hand-Held Infant Carriers, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,354 (proposed
Dec. 10, 2012) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 1112 & 1225).
73. ASTM F2050-12, ASTM Int’l, http://enterprise.astm.org/filtrexx40.cgi?HISTORI-
CAL/F2050-12.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). Despite a promise in the Federal Register that
ASTM would make the standard freely available during the comment period, which ended
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Neither Congress nor the original drafters of OMB Circular No. A-119
clearly anticipated that SDOs would both claim copyrights in their incorpo-
rated standards and charge access fees. The NTTAA does not mention either
copyright or an access price for incorporated standards. Circular No. A-119
does indicate that agencies using voluntary consensus standards are to “ob-
serve and protect the rights of the copyright holder,” but the drafters may
have anticipated agencies seeking permission to reprint private standards in
the Federal Register and CFR. Indeed, the full sentence states that an agency
should protect the rights of the copyright holder “[i]f a voluntary standard is
used and published in an agency document,” suggesting that the OMB may
have anticipated the agency’s reprinting of the text, rather than the SDO’s
charging the public for access.74 That would be consistent with Circular No.
A-130’s comment that “[t]he free flow of information between the govern-
ment and the public is essential to a democratic society.”75 In any event,
current agency practice is to incorporate standards even if SDOs charge a
significant price for access.
And as noted, private SDOs do generally charge significantly. The
amounts far exceed the “direct costs of search, duplication, or review” that
federal agencies may charge for FOIA requests for internal agency docu-
ments.76 By contrast, there is no charge to access statutes and federal regula-
tions (other than IBR rules) in over 1,200 governmental depository
February 25, 2013, see Safety Standard for Hand-Held Infant Carriers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,354, I
was unable to access it during repeated visits to ASTM’s “Reading Room” in January and
February 2013, and I was instead only able to locate a copy for sale at the reported price. The
rule was finalized shortly before this Article went to press with the CPSC’s adoption of an
updated ASTM standard. Safety Standard for Hand-Held Infant Carriers, 78 Fed. Reg. 73.415
(Dec. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts 1112 & 1225) (incorporating by reference ASTM
Standard F2050-13a, with modifications); see also Comment of John L. Conley, President,
Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers 2 (OFR Docket May 30, 2012) [hereinafter Comment of Nat’l Tank
Truck Carriers], available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064
8102543c&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing an example of Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) rulemaking as incorporating a stan-
dard that putative commenters would have to purchase, although noting that PHMSA did
require the two private groups “to make portions of their copyrighted publications available
electronically while the comment period was open”).
74. Circular No. A-119, supra note 60, para. 6(j) (emphasis added). Paragraph 4(a) of
the Circular defines “voluntary consensus standards” eligible for agency use as those including
provisions requiring that owners of relevant intellectual property have agreed to make it
“available on a non-discriminatory, royalty-free or reasonable royalty basis to all interested
parties.” Id., para. 4(a). The term “reasonable royalty” is not further defined, although the
Circular clearly prioritizes availability to all interested persons, presumably including those
with income constraints. The Circular does not restrict agency reliance on nonconsensus
standards.
75. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular No. A-130 Revised: Management of
Federal Information Resources para. 7(c) (2000) [hereinafter Circular No. A-130],
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a130_a130trans4.
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv) (2012). The FOIA also includes fee exemption and
waiver provisions. See id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (discussing fees and requiring no-charge furnish-
ing of requested documents if disclosure would likely “contribute significantly to public un-
derstanding of the operations or activities of the government”).
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libraries.77 As numerous groups and citizens have recently written, the fees
that SDOs charge can be prohibitive, particularly for ordinary citizens and
small businesses subject to the standards. For example, an architect wrote to
the OFR noting that his work often required compliance with the Americans
with Disabilities Act and its implementing regulations, which include some
incorporated standards; the occasional access needed to incorporated stan-
dards was so expensive that the standards could not be considered “reasona-
bly available” to him.78 Similarly, a homeowner pointed out in public
comments that homeowners are normally permitted to perform repairs and
renovations to their own homes without hiring professionals but that for
him to understand the applicable sprinkler system rules, he would have had
to purchase that single standard privately at an “excessive” cost of $82.79
For many years, tank truck operators, as they wrote to the OFR, had to
pay the Compressed Gas Association a significant fee to find out the defini-
tion of a “dent.”80 Trucking is an industry with a high percentage of small
businesses, and as another trade association stated in its letter to the OFR,
“Purchasing technical reference materials can be cost-prohibitive for small
businesses, medium-sized businesses, and individuals.”81 Finally, the New
York City Department of Environmental Protection, responsible for deliver-
ing high-quality drinking water and wastewater services, similarly noted that
“[t]he high costs of many of the standards and the extensive licensing re-
quirements preclude easy access.”82
77. See Federal Depository Library Program, U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, http://www.
gpo.gov/libraries/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2013) (listing libraries and stating, “Anyone can visit a
Federal depository library and will have access to all collections for free”).
78. Comment of James Pettit, Jr., Senior Assoc., Penza Bailey Architects, Inc. 1 (OFR
Docket Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Comment of Penza Bailey Architects], available at http://
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480fe7d25&disposition=attachment&
contentType=pdf; see also Comment of Glen Self 1 (OFR Docket Mar. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480fdbed1&disposition=at-
tachment&contentType=pdf (“During my working career over the past 45 years I have worked
in many areas where the product was governed by regulations that contained [IBR mate-
rial]. . . The worst effect is when work is done improperly because the worker can’t afford to
purchase the standard . . . . [T]he cost of various standards is prohibitively expensive to small
business.”).
79. Comment of Robert Tess 1 (OFR Docket Mar. 23, 2012), available at http://www.
regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480fddd35&disposition=attachment&con-
tentType=pdf; see also Comment of Owen Crabtree, Mech. Eng’r, InSynergy Eng’g, Inc. to
Office of the Fed. Register, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. 1 (OFR Docket Mar. 20, 2012),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480fdbevca&dispo-
sition=attachment&contentType=pdf (“[H]aving this invisible paywall discourages individuals
and entrepreneurs from innovating.”).
80. Comment of Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers, supra note 73, at 3.
81. Comment of Dave Oslecki, Senior Vice President, Policy & Regulatory Affairs, Am.
Trucking Ass’ns 1, 2 (OFR Docket June 1, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/con-
tentStreamer?objectId=0900006481025c7e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
82. Comment of Melinda Sherer, Ass’t Counsel, NYC Envtl. Prot. 1 (OFR Docket May
25, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648101cf
2d&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
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It should be noted that a couple of SDOs have recently decided to pro-
vide free read-only access on their websites for some IBR standards. This is
certainly a positive development, although the “reading rooms” are not easy
to locate and the home pages of the websites do not advertise their exis-
tence.83 Even these SDOs, however, continue to claim a copyright and the
entitlement to revoke free access at any time.84 A reader must also waive any
challenges to the copyright as a condition of getting to see the document.85
Needless to say, the revenue-maximizing choice for SDOs—particularly for
a standard that is not simply voluntary but is incorporated into binding
federal law—may well not be to charge the cheapest price.86 No law or
agency action appears generally aimed at restricting the prices SDOs charge
for IBR standards.87
B. SDO Procedures
Private organizations that issue standards have widely variable processes,
and federal law requires no particular procedures for the development of the
outside material that an agency incorporates by reference.88 By contrast, the
“notice and comment” process for federal agency rulemaking is now well
established. Under the APA, the agency publishes a proposed rule with a
“concise general statement of [its] basis and purpose,” discloses the data
underlying the rule to facilitate public comment, and waits for a stated pe-
riod of time to receive public comments.89 The final rule includes a response
83. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst., http://www.api.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2013);
ASTM Int’l, http://www.astm.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). On the API website, a reader
must click on “Government-Cited and Safety Documents” and then click on another link
bearing the same name to reach a website requiring user registration. Government-Cited and
Safety Documents, Am. Petroleum Inst., http://publications.api.org (last visited Sept. 29,
2013). To navigate to the ASTM reading room, one must click on “Standards & Publications”
on the right sidebar and then select “Reading Room” on the left sidebar of that page. Reading
Room, supra note 33.
84. To access the ASTM Reading Room, a reader must agree to the terms of ASTM’s
License Agreement, which stipulate that all standards are copyrighted by ASTM. ASTM License
Agreement, supra note 30. To access API documents, the reader must accept a license
“acknowledg[ing] that the content . . . is copyrighted and owned by API” and that “API may
suspend or discontinue providing the Online Document to you with or without cause and
without notice.” Government-Cited and Safety Documents, supra note 30.
85. See ASTM License Agreement, supra note 30; Government-Cited and Safety Docu-
ments, supra note 30.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 361–363. Reduced elasticity in market demand
means that buyers will not reduce the quantity they purchase very much even in the face of a
price increase by sellers. As the only supplier of a particular IBR standard with which compli-
ance is federally required, an SDO will thus have substantial power to set prices.
87. The one specific exception seems to be recent pipeline safety legislation. See infra
note 145 and accompanying text.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012).
89. Id. § 553(c); see also United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52
(2d Cir. 1977) (proposed rule document must include any scientific information on which
agency relied); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393–94 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
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to comments, and the agency must republish the rule for additional com-
ment if an intended revision is more than a “logical outgrowth” of the origi-
nal rule.90
With respect to private material, federal law does not restrict incorpora-
tion by reference based on the process used by the private organization. For
example, although it prefers agencies to use standards coming from such
groups over “government-unique” standards, the NTTAA contains no defi-
nition of or criteria for a “voluntary consensus standards body.”91
Circular No. A-119 does provide general criteria: a voluntary consensus
standard is one that comes from a “voluntary consensus standards bod[y],”
which generally has the attributes of “[o]penness,” “[b]alance of interest,”
“[d]ue process,” and an “appeals process,” together with the goal of
“[c]onsensus,” which means that the procedure must be designed to yield
“general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity,” including a “process for
attempting to resolve objections by interested parties.”92 These “voluntary
consensus body” attributes are surely commendable criteria for any delibera-
tive process, including a process run by agency administrators or elected
officials.93 But they are not actually required. Neither statute nor OMB pol-
icy appears to constrain an agency from incorporating a “nonconsensus
standard”94 or even includes a preference for a private consensus standard
(noting that agencies must respond to comments that “step over a threshold requirement of
materiality”).
90. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760, 768 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
relevant inquiry is whether or not potential commentators would have known that an issue in
which they were interested was ‘on the table’ . . . .”).
91. See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 § 12(d),
15 U.S.C. § 272 note (2012) (Utilization of Consensus Technical Standards by Federal
Agencies).
92. Circular No. A-119, supra note 60, para. 4. In its approach to using industry
consensus standards from national organizations for underground storage tanks, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”) also has explained that it means a “nationally recognized
organization” to encompass a “technical or professional organization that has issued standards
formed by the consensus of its members.” Underground Storage Tanks; Technical Require-
ments, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,082, 37,185–86 (Sept. 23, 1988). The EPA listed several such organiza-
tions that had issued codes and standards referenced in the agency’s rules, ranging from the
API to the Underwriters Laboratory. Id. at 37,185 (“[O]rganization[s] should ensure consider-
ation of all relevant viewpoints and interests, including those of consumers . . . .”); see also
Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 78-4, Federal Agency Interaction with
Private Standard-Setting Organizations in Health and Safety 3 (1978), available at
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/78-4.pdf (“An agency having authority to
issue mandatory health or safety regulations should draw on the knowledge and information
available in active technical committees that develop relevant voluntary consensus standards
. . . .”).
93. E.g., Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1347–68 (overviewing ANSI’s procedures as of
1978).
94. Circular No. A-119, supra note 60, para. 6(g) (“This policy does not establish a
preference among [consensus and nonconsensus private] standards . . . . Specifically, agencies
that promulgate regulations referencing non-consensus standards . . . . are not required to
report on these actions . . . .”). But cf. Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem
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over a nonconsensus standard. Research has uncovered no agency rules fur-
ther restricting agency choice among privately developed standards. An
agency seems free to incorporate standards from an SDO with any sort of
process.
Second, as a practical matter, and notwithstanding Circular No. A-119’s
criteria, SDO processes vary widely. At the API, whose standards are incor-
porated close to 280 times in the CFR,95 standards development is under-
taken primarily by committee. While outsiders apparently may participate—
and the API states that governmental officials and academics do participate
on committees—the organization requires a company name for application
to participate, warns that travel is required, and states that it is advisable to
have “your management’s support in order to facilitate effective participa-
tion.”96 Meanwhile, the API’s members come entirely from the petroleum
industry,97 and the API is generally regarded as a representative of that
industry.98
At ASTM International, the SDO that has supplied the most incorpo-
rated standards to the federal government (close to 900 standards, incorpo-
rated over 2,000 times in the CFR99), only members may participate in
standards development; the lowest level of membership costs $75 per year.100
As one commenter pointed out to the OFR last year concerning ASTM toy
standards incorporated into federal rules, “[S]ince this standard [must be
purchased to be read] and is written by a[ ] [nongovernmental organization]
that primarily intersects with industry and related groups, consumers have
little opportunity to participate in rewriting the standard or expressing their
feedback directly to ASTM.”101
of Monopoly 31–32 (1966) (noting that the National Industrial Recovery Act required the
president to find that industrial codes were “truly representative” prior to approving them).
95. See Bremer, supra note 10, at 150. Bremer notes that sixty-three unique standards
created by the API have been incorporated. Id.
96. See Standards Committee Application, Am. Petroleum Inst., http://www.api.org/
publications-standards-and-statistics/standards-committee-application.aspx (last visited Sept.
29, 2013).
97. See API Member Companies, Am. Petroleum Inst., http://www.api.org/global-
items/globalheaderpages/membership/api-member-companies.aspx (last visited Sept. 29,
2013).
98. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Hands off, Oil Industry Warns Government, N.Y. Times
Green Blog (Jan. 8, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/hands-off-
oil-industry-warns-government/?ref=amer (reporting on statement of head of the API).
99. See Bremer, supra note 10, at 150 (885 unique ASTM standards have been incorpo-
rated 2,230 times in the CFR).
100. See Technical Committees, ASTM Int’l, http://www.astm.org/COMMIT/newcom-
mit.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (“Any interested individual can participate on a Technical
Committee [that develops and maintains ASTM standards] through ASTM membership.”).
The least expensive membership is $75 per year, which entitles members to “participate in the
development of high quality, market relevant standards” and to get a discount on ASTM pub-
lications. See Benefits for ASTM Participating Members, ASTM Int’l, http://www.astm.org/
MEMBERSHIP/participatingmem.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
101. Comment of Samantha Gordon 1 (OFR Docket Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480fe4d7a&disposition=attachment&
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The North American Energy Standards Board (“NAESB”) develops
standards that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission incorporates by
reference to define all manner of public utility and natural gas pipeline regu-
lation. Although it permits some state public utility commissions and the
Department of Energy to join,102 NAESB describes itself as a trade organiza-
tion and an “industry forum for the development and promotion of stan-
dards . . . .”103 Membership costs $6,500. Rules under development are
subject to very limited viewing by nonmembers. Although the organization
accepts written comments on draft proposals, NAESB has historically relied
on an in-person committee process for participation and drafting.104 Partici-
pation in that process now requires payment: “Non-members face charges
for meeting participation by telephone or in person ($100 for a meeting of
four hours or less; $300 for a longer one), or for a year’s participation in the
work of a given subcommittee ($1000).”105
The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (“NRECA”), an as-
sociation of over 900 nonprofit rural electric utilities that provide power to
42 million consumers, has commented on the difficulty of participating in
NAESB proceedings. Although the NRECA itself is a member of the NAESB,
a substantial number of its own members are not NAESB members. NRECA
thus cannot “share the [draft] standards with its membership,” although
those members must comply with the standards once finalized.106 This im-
pedes the group’s ability to participate in standards development on behalf
of its members.107
The American Society of Health Systems Pharmacists Drug Information
compendium, which lists acceptable off-label uses of pharmaceuticals and
thus constrains Medicare coverage, does not appear to incorporate public
input at all but instead is developed solely by a “professional staff of drug
information analysts and editors with strong scientific and therapeutic back-
grounds” subject to an unspecified “external review process.”108
contentType=pdf. This problem parallels difficulties in international standards organizations.
See Tim Bu¨the and Walter Mattli, The New Global Rulers 224 (2011) (“[C]onsumer
representatives are frequently viewed as ‘outsiders’ in private-sector rule-making bodies.”).
102. Strauss, supra note 2, at 539 n.271.
103. See About NAESB, N. Am. Energy Standards Bd., http://www.naesb.org/aboutus.
asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). For its comments, see Comment of N. Am. Energy Standards
Bd., supra note 45.
104. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 539–41.
105. Id. at 541.
106. Comment of Richard Meyer, Senior Regulatory Counsel, Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop.
Ass’n, and Adrienne E. Clair, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP 3 (OFR Docket Mar. 28, 2012),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480fe3ed2&dispo-
sition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
107. See id. at 5–6.
108. See Off-Label Uses: Overview, AHFS Drug Info., http://www.ahfsdruginformation.
com/off_label/overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
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The American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), a nonprofit that
has supplied the federal government with close to 200 standards incorpo-
rated by reference into more than 550 rules109 and that has the most exten-
sive and most appealing procedural requirements for a proposed “American
National Standard,” depends on numerous “standards developer” groups to
supply standards. ANSI provides complex accreditation and procedural re-
quirements for these groups in a twenty-seven-page document.110 These
groups must be accredited by ANSI, follow its processes in developing stan-
dards, and then publish suggested new standards through a weekly ANSI
publication, ANSI Standards Action, for comment and public review.111
ANSI provides for public comment on its draft standards, as do ANSI-ac-
credited groups such as the ASME.112 A representative of ASME has further
stated that the group attempts to solicit participation from “every kind of
stakeholder,”113 surely a valuable goal. Once the group resolves objections to
proposed standards, it submits the proposed standards, together with the
resolution of objections, to the ANSI Board of Standards Review.114 A stan-
dard will be eligible for designation as an “American National Standard” if
the developer has attempted to resolve conflicts, shows consensus, and states
that it has complied with its applicable procedures, among other criteria.115
Internal appeals are even available.116
Even with these demanding procedural requirements, ANSI’s processes
are far from fully “open.” Prior to publication in the newsletter, public in-
formation on which standards are under development is hard to acquire,
109. See Bremer, supra note 10, at 150 (179 ANSI standards incorporated into 554 fed-
eral rules).
110. See generally Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., ANSI Essential Requirements: Due
Process Requirements for American National Standards (2013), available at http://pub-
licaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Stan-
dards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2013_ANSI_Essential_Requirements.pdf.
111. See, e.g., ANSI Standards Action, Feb. 22, 2013, available at http://publicaa.ansi.
org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Action/2013_PDFs/SAV4408.pdf.
112. E.g., Notice of Public Workshop to Discuss Implementing Incorporation by Reference
Requirements of Section 24 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of
2011, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (July 13, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://mediasite.yorkcast.com/webcast/
Viewer/?peid=e8c2cc8919ef41a7821e7f6c85b35f111d; see also Joseph Wendler, Dir. of Stan-
dards and Certification Initiatives, Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Statement of ASME Representa-
tive (July 13, 2012), available at https://law.resource.org/pub/us/cfr/regulations.gov.docket.03/
phmsa.workshop/workshop.01.08.html (transcribing statement given beginning at slide 55 of
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., supra).
113. Wendler, supra note 112.
114. Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., ANSI Essential Requirements, supra note 110, at
15–16.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 9–10.
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and draft standards must often be purchased to exercise any right to com-
ment.117 According to one official at ANSI, even if proposed standards modi-
fications are freely available to the public, the underlying standards will only
be made available through purchase.118 Just as with a modification to a fed-
eral-agency-drafted rule, making sense of proposed modifications without
the context of the underlying standard can obviously be difficult. For exam-
ple, draft revisions to an ANSI standard on medical and psychological re-
quirements for nuclear power plant reactor operators were posted for
comment during the writing of this Article. My searching revealed that the
original standard, however, was available only on payment of $30.119 Simi-
larly, a proposed ANSI standard originally developed by the American Lad-
der Institute on safety requirements for ladder accessories was only available
on payment of $50.120
Moreover, it remains unclear whether participation in these standards
development procedures is even roughly representative of the range of pub-
lic views, despite ANSI’s commitment to an “open” process. For example,
among ANSI’s accredited standards developers are the API, whose member-
ship and processes have already been described, and the American Iron and
Steel Institute (“AISI”),121 which describes itself as the “voice of the North
American steel industry.”122
ANSI’s requirements surely appear laudable, but they are unlikely to
ensure a representative participation process or even one that is truly open
to the public. This is because a member of the public will face significant
obstacles to meaningful participation. An interested citizen may have a diffi-
cult time discovering that a standard is under development and will then
have to pay to read it in order to comment. Moreover, when Congress
passed the NTTAA, small business witnesses testified that significant costs—
including traveling to SDO meetings—impeded their participation in SDO
117. See Call for Comment on Proposals Listed, ANSI Standards Action, Feb. 22, 2013,
at 1, available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Action/2013_
PDFs/SAV4408.pdf (providing suggested changes to multiple standards but omitting full stan-
dards); Wendler, supra note 112 (noting that only “revisions” are published in advance of
comment period).
118. Telephone Interview with Patricia Schroeder, Am. Nat’l Standards Inst. (Jan. 29,
2013) (notes on file with author).
119. Call for Comment on Proposals Listed, supra note 117, at 3.
120. Id.
121. See generally ANSI-Accredited Standards Developers Contact Information, ANSI
Standards Action, Feb. 22, 2013, at 22, available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Docu-
ments/Standards%20Action/2013_PDFs/SAV4408.pdf.
122. About AISI, Am. Iron & Steel Inst., http://www.steel.org/en/About%20AISI.aspx
(describing its twenty-six “integrated and electric furnace steelmaker” members and 125 asso-
ciate or affiliate members who are “suppliers to or customers of the steel industry”) (last
visited Sept. 29, 2013).
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standards development.123 Challenges to participation in SDO standards de-
velopment are likely to be at least as significant for consumers, Medicare
recipients, and other interested individuals.124
By contrast, while participation in federal rulemaking might too be crit-
icized as less than perfectly representative,125 filing comments in any pending
federal rulemaking by using http://www.regulations.gov is comparatively
straightforward. Apart from the necessity of online access, which can be ob-
tained at a local public library, the relevant documents can be accessed with-
out charge, and anyone can freely comment.
At best, then, full public access to SDO decisionmaking is limited, and
even when such an organization’s process is formally open to participation,
it is often difficult to tell who participates in decisions. At worst, groups may
be unrepresentative and decisionmaking closed. SDOs have been criticized
as being dominated by regulated entities and, in particular, by the largest of
those entities.126 For example, the Pipeline Research Council International,
which has supplied a few IBR standards to the Department of Transporta-
tion, is “a community of the world’s leading pipeline companies.”127 As
noted, the API and the AISI both identify themselves as voices for their re-
spective industry communities.128
SDOs may also vary in their approaches to information gathering and
analysis, as well as in their goals. At their most basic, SDO standards may
simply not be targeted to achieving the goals of federal statutes that agencies
must implement. In one study of privately developed standards incorporated
by OSHA, Professors Shapiro and McGarity found that the standards often
provided “limited protection for workers” because “industry-dominated
committees are more reluctant than OSHA to characterize a substance as a
carcinogen, and less likely to rely on published scientific data instead of in-
dustry-supplied information.”129 Similarly, Shapiro discusses the difficulties
123. Small business representatives testified to this effect in the mid-1990s when Con-
gress enacted the NTTAA. Wolf, supra note 18, at 821 (“[M]embers of the business community
testified that the standards development process discriminated against small business[es,
which] often lack the time, money, and workforce necessary to send representatives across the
country to participate in various SDO meetings.”).
124. See, e.g., Comment of Rachel Weintraub, Dir. of Prod. Safety and Senior Counsel,
Consumer Fed’n of Am. 1 (OFR Docket June 1, 2012) [hereinafter Comment of Consumer
Fed’n of Am.], available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006481
023352&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (“Without unfettered access to these stan-
dards . . . important constituencies such as individual consumers and public interest and
consumer organizations will be unable to participate in these proceedings.”).
125. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 338–339.
126. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 534,
641–42 (2000); Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1372–73; Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Govern-
ment Regulation, 53 Duke L.J. 389, 407–08 (2003).
127. About PRCI, Pipeline Research Council Int’l, http://prci.org/index.php/about/
(last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 98, 122.
129. Shapiro, supra note 126, at 408 (citing Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Sha-
piro, Workers at Risk 283 (1993)).
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with federal reliance on accounting standards developed by the industry it-
self.130 Moreover, some have alleged that “consensus” product safety stan-
dards are very often inadequate to “reduce or eliminate an unreasonable
risk” from the product,131 which is the Consumer Product Safety Act’s re-
quirement for such safety standards.132
Further, although federal agencies generally conduct their own notice
and comment proceedings when incorporating a private standard, and this
federal rulemaking process is open to the public at http://
www.regulations.gov, the process’s usefulness in filling potential gaps in
SDO processes is likely to be limited. The text proposed for incorporation
must often be obtained from an SDO, rather than directly from the Federal
Register.133 Further, unlike federal agencies, private SDOs appear to be
under no particular or consistent obligation to disclose the data underlying
their standards to the public.134 For example, the APA and the FOIA apply
only to agencies.135 While I have not conducted a systematic study, at least
some such research supporting these standards also appears to be copy-
righted and only available for a fee. For example, a proposed regulation by
the CPSC authorizing the use of an ASTM method for measuring lead con-
centrations for paint layers to determine compliance with federal standards
stated that the supporting data could be obtained by requesting an identified
research report from ASTM.136 This report is only available from ASTM for
a price of $54.137 Other research reports available online are similarly
130. Id. at 406–11. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act ultimately displaced these standards. Id. at
409.
131. See Comment of Consumer Fed’n of Am., supra note 124, at 2.
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2012) (“A consumer product safety standard . . . . shall be
reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce unreasonable risk of injury associated with such
product.”).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
134. E.g., United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir. 1977);
Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393–94 (D.C. Cir. 1973). As yet, the
courts do not appear to have addressed the question whether the APA might require this sort
of disclosure when a federal agency proposes to incorporate an SDO standard by reference.
135. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (defining “agency” as
“each authority of the Government of the United States”); Freedom of Information Act, id.
§ 552 (requiring “agenc[ies]” to comply with disclosure requirements); Int’l Brominated Sol-
vents Ass’n v. Am. Conference of Gov’t and Indus. Hygienists, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1379–80 (M.D. Ga. 2005) (refusing to find that ACGIH was an “agency” for purposes of the
APA despite ACGIH’s issuance of de facto “exposure levels” adopted by OSHA); see also id. at
1383–84 (refusing to hold that ACGIH was subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act).
136. Third Party Testing for Certain Children’s Products; Notice of Requirements for
Accreditation of Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies—Lead Paint, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,645,
18,646 (Mar. 30, 2011) (to be codifed at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1303) (finding that only test methods
specified by CPSC rule and by ASTM F2853-10 are considered effective for testing paint and
surface coatings; stating that “[s]upporting data . . . ha[ve] been filed with ASTM and can be
obtained by contacting ASTM”).
137. Telephone Interview with ASTM Customer Serv. (Feb. 26, 2013) (notes on file
with author).
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priced.138 The price for accessing supporting data, as well as regulatory text,
impedes individuals and entities from filing meaningful comments through
the federal notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
Finally, even after standards are incorporated, SDOs do not seem bound
to continue making incorporated standards available at any price, even when
they are referenced in and compose a portion of federally binding law. As
Strauss discusses, OSHA rules for construction incorporate ANSI require-
ments in mandatory signage rules, requirements that cannot now be ac-
cessed and are not even listed as among ANSI’s publications.139 Similarly,
OSHA’s mandatory safety standards for cranes incorporate an ANSI re-
quirement that is no longer available from ANSI at all.140 These standards
may still be viewed in the OFR reading room in Washington, D.C., but this
is clearly insufficient access for a regulated entity or an interested person in,
say, Oklahoma. While the rule is not “secret,” that the text is available only
in the Washington, D.C., reading room might well supply a regulated entity
with a due process defense to enforcement of the rule.141 In these settings,
the SDO, rather than the agency, has effectively repealed the federal standard
by sharply curtailing access—contrary to the requirements of the APA.142
In short, IBR standards are developed in processes that are not consist-
ently open to the public, cannot easily be found in the Federal Register or
the CFR, and are primarily available—whether the standards are under de-
velopment or finalized—for a significant payment set by the private entity
supplying them or by paying the cost of traveling to Washington, D.C. Even
studies supporting the standards may be subject to access charges, further
impeding the usefulness of the federal notice-and-comment process as a
means of obtaining public input on the incorporated standards. Finally,
without explanation or agency process, SDOs have made some incorporated
standards entirely unavailable, likely undermining or even eliminating their
enforceability.
138. See Research Reports by Committee, ASTM Int’l, http://www.astm.org/Standard/
researchreports.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
139. Strauss, supra note 2, at 549–51.
140. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.179(b)(2) (2012) (“All new overhead and gantry cranes . . .
shall meet the design specifications of . . . ANSI B30.2.0-1967, which is incorporated by refer-
ence . . . .”). This standard is neither catalogued nor available on the ANSI website. See Am.
Nat’l Standards Inst., http://www.ansi.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). The ASME standard
cited in the Introduction for determining the strength of corroded pipelines, see supra text
accompanying note 15, also appears to be unavailable from ASME. See Am. Nat’l Standards
Inst., supra.
141. See infra note 191 (citing cases discussing due process’s “fair warning”
requirement).
142. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) (“ ‘[R]ule making’ means agency process for formu-
lating, amending, or repealing a rule.”). It could be, of course, that these federal standards are
so old that they need to be revised, but having this decision effectively under unilateral private
control raises troubling legal issues and shows the potential extent of private control over
access to public standards.
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II. Does Law Need to Be Public?
The IBR situation runs afoul of a widely shared intuition—that law cre-
ated by the federal government needs to be public. The rules are not secret,
but unlike other binding federal law, they are expensive to access and diffi-
cult to find. The lack of access raises important issues about transparency.
To be sure, public access issues around IBR rules have been less of a focal
point compared with public access to a range of less broadly applicable, but
more captivating, governmental decisions: say, whether and whom to wire-
tap or whether drone strikes can be used abroad (or domestically) to target
American citizens who are suspected terrorists. Meanwhile, proponents of
IBR have suggested that, despite the lack of access, it saves agencies signifi-
cant resources to use these rules, and (perhaps unlike wiretapping decisions)
some citizens may not see them as terribly interesting or important because
they are “technical.”143
In the IBR setting, we have spent comparatively little time assessing why
duly promulgated federal rules might need to be readily accessible to the
public. Examining the extent of public access to IBR rules can supply some
further insights into the arguments about why law needs to be accessible to
the public. And the issue may matter immediately for several reasons.
First, it could matter for purposes of legal reform by Congress, the exec-
utive branch, or the judiciary. Congress could, as it has with the Pipeline
Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011,144 simply state
that all materials incorporated into federal rules must be available to the
public for free, or it could expressly address the copyright and public access
issues in another way.145
Similarly, fully assessing why law needs to be public could affect execu-
tive reform decisions. As noted, the OFR is proposing to revise its IBR
rules.146 And the OMB has indicated that it may consider revising Circular
No. A-119.147 Meanwhile, individual agencies could change their incorpora-
tion practices.
Further, IBR rules could face legal challenges under the APA and the
FOIA. For example, one could argue that agency utilization of material for
143. See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 10, at 183 (“[I]t bears noting that most standards
incorporated by reference . . . are highly technical. Even if . . . freely available, it may not be
meaningfully accessible to members of the public . . . .”).
144. Pub. L. No. 112-90, § 24, 125 Stat. 1904, 1919 (2012) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 60102(p)) (barring incorporation by reference in either guidance or regulations unless rele-
vant documents are “made available to the public, free of charge, on an Internet Web site”),
amended by Pub. L. No. 113-30 § 1, 127 Stat. 510 (2013) (delaying effective date and deleting
requirements for guidance documents and internet availability but retaining free availability
requirements).
145. See Wendler, supra note 112 (“We submitted letters to both the Senate and House
of Representatives requesting a repeal of [the Pipeline Safety Act] provision.”).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 40–44.
147. Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Stan-
dards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,357 (Mar. 30, 2012).
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which SDOs charge access fees violates the FOIA’s statutory requirement
that incorporated materials be reasonably available to the “class of persons
affected.”148 The term “affected” could be broadly construed to include more
than just those tasked with compliance.149 And any reasonable sense of the
words “persons affected” would seem to encompass, depending on the sub-
ject area, large groups of consumers, employees in hazardous workplaces,
Medicare beneficiaries, and neighbors of natural gas pipelines.150 For such
“affected” persons, the access fees charged may present a barrier that is far
from “reasonable.” The thousands of IBR standards are wide ranging in sub-
ject and quasi-legislative in character. Yet, the only access is typically
through travel to the Washington, D.C., OFR reading room or what SDOs
elect to provide.
A court might also hear arguments that a federal rule with incorporated
private material for which access fees are charged violates the APA. The APA
requires that an “interested person[ ]” be able to comment on a proposed
rule.151 Commenting is difficult, at best, when the text of the proposed rule
is subject to a significant access fee. The APA also requires agencies to afford
any “interested person” the right to petition to revise, repeal, or issue a
rule.152 That SDOs are permitted to charge significant access fees similarly
impedes the statutory right to petition. Finally, SDO decisions to cease pub-
lishing standards that are incorporated by reference into federal rules would
seem to amount to de facto regulatory repeal, in violation of the APA’s re-
quirements that notice-and-comment procedures accompany repeal or
amendment of a federal rule.153 Again, a more thorough understanding of
the reasons for public access to the law might affect the way a court inter-
prets and applies the APA.
A fuller understanding of the importance of ready public access to law
might also be relevant to a judicial assessment of whether Congress granted
the OFR the authority to interpret the APA in a way that raises arguable
constitutional issues—namely, by interfering with fair notice for individuals
148. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1). These arguments are developed in more detail in the public
comments of the American Bar Association Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory
Policy filed in response to the petition to the OFR to revise IBR rules. See Comment of ABA
Admin. Law Section, supra note 39. I contributed substantially to this document.
149. For example, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) provides special protection for those “required
to resort to” government rules and policies, clearly a narrower class than those “affected.”
150. Moreover, 5 U.S.C. § 702 uses the narrower term “adversely affected” to help de-
fine who can seek judicial review of agency action. This is nonetheless understood to cover a
wide range of those with concrete interests in agency action, beyond those who are directly
regulated. E.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011) (holding that one
who is “adversely affected” may challenge agency action if the interest is arguably “within the
zone of interests” of the statute).
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); cf. United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240,
251–52 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring agencies to disclose data to effectuate a meaningful right to
public comment).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
153. See id. § 551(5) (defining “rule making” as “agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule”).
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or small businesses lacking the resources to access standards,154 by impeding
public criticism of governmental actions,155 or by adopting a system that
differentiates between citizens based on wealth.156 And finally, a more thor-
ough assessment of the importance of ensuring meaningful access to federal
rules could affect our approach, more generally, to governmental
transparency.
I accordingly turn to a brief history of public access to U.S. laws, fol-
lowed by an assessment of the values served by public access to these laws.
A. The Establishment of Public Access to Statutes and Regulations
Since at least 1795, the U.S. tradition has been to provide inexpensive
and widespread public access to the law. Prior to 1795, at least three newspa-
pers in each state were responsible for printing authentic copies of laws and
regulations.157 Access to laws through the newspapers was not free, although
subscription charges were reportedly low.158 Moreover, through the 1792
Post Office Act, Congress provided for newspapers to be carried in the mail
at rates far lower than for letters, specifically for “the diffusion of knowl-
edge,” including public information.159
Although publication in newspapers might be understood to effectuate
a fairly wide distribution of the contents of the law—and federal utilization
of private publishers was probably less expensive than governmental publi-
cation—by 1795, Congress decided to stop relying on newspapers to apprise
the public of the law’s contents. Instead, Congress took on the distribution
of the laws as a public function, including providing the public with free
access through libraries.160 Of course, Congress did not, and still does not,
require distribution of a free set of laws to each citizen. But beginning in
154. See infra notes 191–193 and accompanying text (on fair notice requirements).
155. See infra notes 344, 346–347 and accompanying text (on freedom of speech and
equal protection issues).
156. See infra text accompanying note 347.
157. In 1789, the secretary of state was to send authenticated copies of slip laws to
senators, representatives, and governors, and to select at least three newspapers in each state in
which the laws would be published. Act of Sept. 15, 1789, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 68; see also Peter
Hernon et al., United States Government Information: Policies and Sources 339
(2002); Richard J. McKinney, United States Statutes: Historical Outline and Source
Notes (rev. 2008), available at http://www.llsdc.org/assets/sourcebook/us-statutes-outline.pdf;
Culver H. Smith, The Press, Politics, and Patronage: The American Government’s
Use of Newspapers, 1789–1875 39 (1977); John Spencer Walters, Whose Vision Fulfilled? To-
ward a Rightful Ideological Progenitor for the U.S. Federal Depository Library Program, 26 J.
Gov’t Info. 347, 349–50 (1999) (noting Madison’s shift in viewpoint to arranging for news-
papers to publish political information).
158. Subscription rates were “low, the typical rate being for a daily ten dollars a year,
and a weekly two dollars and fifty cents.” Smith, supra note 157, at 10.
159. Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen 67 (1998) (quoting letter of Representa-
tive John Steele to his constituents). Newspapers received discounted mailing rates from the
post office to facilitate the distribution of public information. Smith, supra note 157, at 6–7.
160. Perhaps needless to say, an individual’s purchase of a private bound copy of the
multivolume U.S. Code would not be free of charge.
March 2014] Private Control over Access to the Law 765
1795, the House and Senate agreed that “more general promulgation of the
laws of the United States” was appropriate.161 As a result, Congress enacted
legislation requiring that a complete edition of the laws to date, the Consti-
tution, and current treaties, as well as newly enacted laws, be printed under
the direction of the secretary of state and distributed to “each State or Terri-
tory.” The texts would be deposited in “fixed and convenient places in each
county or subordinate civil division,” as the state government might judge
“most conducive to the general information of the people.”162 This develop-
ment coincided with a general increase in the number of libraries.163 And by
1859, Congress had provided for the permanent retention of governmental
publications by libraries and other designated depositories.164 The Statutes at
Large, for example, were to be distributed to “State and Territorial libraries
and to designated depositories.”165
In the 1930s, with an upsurge of rules, particularly the large volume of
New Deal rules under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress recog-
nized that administrative rules, unlike the Statutes at Large and the U.S.
Code, were being published in a fashion that was disorganized and ad hoc at
best, although the rules possessed the force of law and “the property and
persons of the citizens may be at stake.”166 As the Federal Register Act legis-
lative history describes, Harvard Law professor (later dean) Erwin Griswold
helped identify the problem and devise a solution.167 By that time, there had
even been litigation in which the government brought an action to enforce a
regulatory requirement that turned out not to exist.168
161. H.R. Journal, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 328–29 (1795) (describing Act of Mar. 3, 1795).
162. Id.; see also Act of Dec. 23, 1817, res. 2, 3 Stat. 473 (providing that the secretary of
state must distribute a set of state papers and public documents to executives and legislatures
in the “several states and territories,” as well as to “each University and College in the United
States”).
163. E.g., Schudson, supra note 159, at 119 (“From 1790 to 1815, five hundred New
England towns established libraries.”).
164. Act of Feb. 5, 1859, ch. 22, § 10, 11 Stat. 379, 381; see also Hernon et al., supra
note 157, at 340 (discussing that the Act’s provisions transferring document responsibility
from secretary of state to secretary of the interior). In 1895, Congress transferred the position
of superintendent of documents from the Department of the Interior to the Government
Printing Office. Id. at 341. On government depository libraries, including a directory, see gen-
erally Federal Depository Library Program, supra note 77.
165. Act of Jan. 12, 1895, ch. 23, §§ 54, 62, 73, 28 Stat. 601, 608, 610–20.
166. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 74-280, at 2 (1935) (“[R]ules and regulations frequently
appear in separate paper pamphlets, some printed on single sheets of paper and easily lost.
Any attempt to compile a complete private collection of [them] . . . would be wellnigh impos-
sible. No law library, public or private, contains them all. Officials of the department issuing
them frequently do not know all of their own regulations.”).
167. Griswold, supra note 5, at 198.
168. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 74-280, at 2–3 (citing United States v. Smith, 293 U.S. 633
(1934) (mem.)); Julius F. Stone, Jr. & George S. Pettee, Revision of Private Law, 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 221, 242 (1940); Oil Suit Dismissed in Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1934, at 6
(following appeal, government unilaterally withdrew case of oil quota violation because rele-
vant executive order did not contain oil quota requirement); cf. Urban Lavery, The “Federal
Register”—Official Publication for Administrative Regulations, Etc., 7 F.R.D. 625, 626 (1947)
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Congress accordingly formally expanded the publication regime to in-
clude federal agency rules beginning in 1936. Federal Register sets, as well as
the CFR, are now maintained by depository libraries. Congress has repeat-
edly acted to expand public access to agency rules and other documents. For
example, Congress expanded the publication regime to provide for free digi-
tal access at the approximately 1,200 governmental depository libraries for
all federal statutes and regulations.169 Congress went further in 1993, requir-
ing the Government Printing Office to make universal online access to stat-
utes and regulations available, defining recoverable costs as the “incremental
cost of dissemination,”170 a very small charge per user in the information
age,171 and a charge barred, in any event, at depository libraries. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, therefore, the Government Printing Office has elected not to
impose any costs at all.172
In 1996, in the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments,
Congress required agencies to make available, by “electronic means,” indices
of records that have been released to the public under the FOIA, and, for
records created beginning late in 1996, the records themselves.173 Congress’s
express purpose was to “improve public access to agency records and infor-
mation” and to “foster democracy by ensuring public access to agency
records and information.”174 And in 2002, in the e-Government Act, Con-
gress required agencies to provide for electronic rulemaking and electronic
rulemaking dockets and to post on their websites a wide range of materials,
with the express purposes of “increas[ing] access, accountability, and trans-
parency” and “enhanc[ing] public participation in Government.”175
(quoting Dean Wigmore on Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), in which the
attorney general “admitted that the trial had proceeded below in ignorance of [the regulation]
upon which the prosecution had rested” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169. Free internet availability is provided publicly, e.g., Federal Digital System, supra
note 8, as well as privately, e.g., Legal Information Institute, Cornell Univ. Law Sch., http://
www.law.cornell.edu/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
170. 44 U.S.C. § 4102(b) (2006).
171. See Bruce R. Kingma, The Costs of Print, Fiche, and Digital Access: The Early
Canadiana Online Project, D-Lib Mag. (Feb. 2000), http://www.dlib.org/dlib/february00/
kingma/02kingma.html (“In theory, once the fixed costs of digitization are incurred there is a
zero marginal cost of providing an additional copy.”).
172. See Nat’l Acad. of Pub. Admin., Rebooting the Government Printing Of-
fice 37 (2013), available at http://www.napawash.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/GPO-Fi-
nal.pdf (noting that the Government Printing Office (“GPO”) elected not to charge users for
access to digital content because “administrative costs of collecting payments were higher than
what GPO could charge”).
173. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
231, § 4(7), 110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) to require agencies to make
documents available through “electronic means”).
174. Id. § 2(b)(1)–(2), 110 Stat. 3048.
175. See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, §§ 206(a)–(d), 207(f), 116
Stat. 2899, 2915–16, 2918–19 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006) note (Federal
Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services)).
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The regular incorporation by reference of private standards into federal
regulations predates Congress’s move to “enhance free public access to Fed-
eral electronic information”176 but is still a comparatively recent innovation,
apparently beginning in the 1970s.177 The SDOs have also charged for access
to their standards,178 although the size of the charges has not become an
issue until recently.179 As discussed above, neither Circular No. A-119 nor
the NTTAA indicate approval of private charging for access to incorporated
standards. Thus, the IBR phenomenon contrasts significantly with the gen-
eral legislative trend of increasing public access to binding law. Moreover,
although far less visible, agency use of IBR rules harks back in important
ways to the 1930s. The privately written, federally approved industrial codes
under the National Industrial Recovery Act represented a substantial regula-
tory contribution under the New Deal.180 They were not secret by design,
but these regulations, too, were nonetheless extraordinarily difficult to lo-
cate, scattered among numerous disparate locations. The often-substantial
access fees SDOs charge only make that access problem worse.
B. Transparency, “Open Government,” and Federal Rules
Ironically, the reduced accessibility of IBR rules has coincided with in-
creased calls for—and a heightened public commitment to—“open govern-
ment” and transparency. For example, governmental data on the quality and
cost of particular schools has become more publicly available.181 Likewise,
the public has increasingly called for disclosure of information relating to
state secrets,182 warrantless surveillance,183 and policies on drone use.184 Pres-
ident Obama expressed a commitment to transparency immediately upon
176. See 139 Cong. Rec. 4880 (1993) (statement of Sen. Ford) (“I believe this bill [the
Government Printing Office Electronic Information Access Enhancement Act of 1993] goes a
long way toward ensuring that taxpayers have affordable and timely access to the Federal infor-
mation which they have paid to generate.”).
177. See Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1372 (“Since 1970, Congress has produced a
stream of legislation that to a greater or lesser extent contemplates the limited use of voluntary
standards by federal agencies.”).
178. E.g., id. at 1418 n.304 (“[O]ne must purchase the [Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion] standard from ANSI or another organization . . . . Although this preserves the private
organization’s publications sales, it is most inconvenient for the reader.”).
179. Bremer, supra note 10, at 135 (“Despite its ubiquitous use, incorporation by refer-
ence in federal regulations has . . . escaped scholarly examination.”).
180. See generally Hawley, supra note 94, at 55–56 (noting 1933 approval of codes for
the cotton textile industry followed by the shipbuilding, wool textile, electrical manufacturing,
steel, petroleum, automobiles, and lumber industries).
181. E.g., Education, Data.gov, http://www.data.gov/education/community/education
(last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (supplying government information to the public on school quality
and funding).
182. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 Const.
Comment. 625, 640–50 (2010).
183. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 52, at 389–406.
184. E.g., Editorial, Drone Strikes Under Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 2013, at A26,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/opinion/drone-strikes-under-scrutiny.html.
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taking office: “Transparency promotes accountability and provides informa-
tion for citizens about what their Government is doing.”185
Whether IBR rules must be freely accessible to the public is a more
broadly relevant topic, however, and it offers a chance to more systematically
consider transparency issues. Access to IBR rules contrasts sharply with the
accessibility of the U.S. Code and the CFR, both freely available to anyone
online and in the over 1,200 depository libraries nationwide.186 But IBR
rules are also more available than other, nonlegislative governmental deci-
sions, such as classified, top secret, or confidential documents, for which the
government has prohibited unauthorized disclosure.187 No claim of secrecy
is made for the text of IBR rules. A New York Times reporter with a signifi-
cant expense account, for example, could get an IBR rule’s text by locating
the SDO and expending the newspaper’s budget on the (sometimes substan-
tial) access fee or by purchasing a train ticket to Washington, D.C. Yet these
financial burdens, together with the significant obstacles to locating the rule,
may significantly hinder the potential reader.
So, how much does this matter? In the context of binding federal rules,
multiple theoretical and policy perspectives make clear that the extent of
access matters significantly and that the current, highly limited access is
deeply problematic. Providing meaningful transparency for IBR rules ought
to be understood to imply far greater access.
With respect to binding law, the arguments have centrally been about
notice to those who must comply. Due process requires that regulated enti-
ties receive fair notice of their obligations before the government sanctions
them for noncompliance. This due process requirement must imply some
reasonable level of public access. The need for notice goes further, however.
As shown by the example of IBR rules, both regulated entities and regulatory
beneficiaries—those that expect to benefit from the way the government
regulates others—need notice of the content of the laws. Accordingly, access
opportunities must be reasonable for both regulated entities and regulatory
beneficiaries.
In a democratic system, transparency also ensures some level of legal
and political accountability for the exercise of governmental power. These
arguments have often been phrased in rhetorical terms. The threat of expo-
sure, for example, may deter governmental malfeasance or abuse.188 And cer-
tainly, the intrepid reporter could, if she wishes, obtain access to IBR rules
185. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres.
Doc., no. 10, at 1 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-
200900010/pdf/DCPD-200900010.pdf.
186. See Federal Digital System, supra note 8. Session laws and individual Federal Regis-
ter issues dating from the early 1990s have been made available online; previous issues may be
freely viewed at depository libraries. See id.; Federal Depository Library Program, supra note 77
(“Anyone can visit a Federal depository library and will have access to all collections for
free.”).
187. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 2, 1982) (describing classi-
fication system).
188. See, e.g., Bentham, supra note 52.
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for a price. In the setting of the administrative state, however, the simple
threat of exposure does not provide meaningful accountability. Accountabil-
ity mechanisms for federal rules both are and need to be more varied and
decentralized. These mechanisms cannot function adequately if large num-
bers of people or entities with limited budgets face significant obstacles to
reading the laws. This is so even if these materials are not formally secret.
Using the frame of collaborative governance to understand IBR rules sharp-
ens the point.
Finally, agency incorporation of standards that the public must gener-
ally pay to see sends a message that is inconsistent with core democratic
values. Requiring the public to pay to see the law undermines open discus-
sion of public affairs, equal treatment, and participation in the electoral pro-
cess as a means of consenting to government and ensuring the
accountability of government for its power.
1. Transparency and Notice
Take the notice issue first. Very clearly, the text of IBR materials needs to
be readily, publicly accessible to give notice to those who must conform
their conduct to the content of the standards. In short, regulated entities
need to be able to learn their obligations easily.189 As the House Committee
on the Judiciary wrote, “the property and persons of the citizens may be at
stake,”190 and due process bars the imposition of sanctions on someone who
could not have received notice of her obligations.191
Small businesses charged with compliance, however, have continued to
complain that the prices charged by SDOs are too high for them to apprise
themselves of their obligations.192 And as noted above, SDOs can even make
standards effectively unavailable by no longer offering them for sale. The
financial and other access barriers present real challenges for even compli-
ance-focused businesses and, indeed, raise constitutional due process
concerns.193
189. See Cunningham, supra note 45, at 321 (“To the extent legal materials define rights
and duties of citizens, they must be freely accessible or else run afoul of due process
considerations.”).
190. H.R. Rep. No. 74-280, at 2 (1935).
191. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167–68 (2012)
(alteration in original) (refusing to defer to agency interpretation in view of “the principle that
agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits
or requires’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986))); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324,
1328–29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reaffirming fair notice requirement in civil administrative context).
192. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 80–81 (comments of truckers).
193. See supra note 191 (agencies must provide “fair notice” to regulated entities). To
the extent that the OFR’s interpretation of “reasonably available” comes close to the constitu-
tional line, it may not be considered authorized by the statute. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (“Where an administrative interpretation of a
statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress
intended that result.”); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979).
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Even when standards are available at a price that regulated entities can
afford, notice concerns stretch beyond these entities. IBR standards—like all
regulatory standards—also tangibly affect the “property and persons” of
regulatory beneficiaries. This is certainly true for those who benefit directly
from governmental action by receiving payments or vouchers for services
from the government.194 Pharmaceutical compendia, for example, concretely
affect Medicare coverage for drugs.
And for each of the regulatory regimes described above or by other
commentators, there are indirect regulatory beneficiaries, whether individu-
als or entities. The regulation (or lack thereof) of oil pipelines running
through communities affects not just oil pipeline operators, but neighboring
residents and businesses. Regulation of foods, pharmaceuticals, herbal prod-
ucts, automotive tires, and airplanes affects not just manufacturers, but con-
sumers and travelers. Regulatory standards will affect the “property and
persons,” in the Judiciary Committee’s words, of both regulated entities and
these indirect regulatory beneficiaries.
The effect on regulatory beneficiaries is not incidental or fortuitous.195
As I have discussed elsewhere, Congress passes regulatory statutes specifi-
cally aimed at guarding beneficiary interests.196 This gives beneficiaries a rea-
sonable expectation of helpful action from the agencies charged with
implementing these statutes. Thus, regulatory beneficiaries, like regulated
entities, should be able to learn the content of regulatory standards. One
reason is that beneficiaries are entitled to participate in the development of
standards and to hold agencies accountable for issuing them, as I will discuss
in greater detail below.197
More specifically, however, indirect regulatory beneficiaries need notice
of the content of regulatory standards because those standards can affect
their conduct. This is so even though regulatory beneficiaries may not be
under the threat of governmental sanctions or even directly receive govern-
mental benefits. Consumers Union, an arm of the publication Consumer Re-
ports, has written, for example, that it often tests consumer products,
notifies the CPSC, and “warn[s] consumers about products that do not
comply with existing standards, thus creating a public safety hazard.”198 For
standards to play this role, however, citizens must have meaningful access.
194. E.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymak-
ing, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 397, 414 (2007).
195. Cf. Comment of A Concerned Citizen (OFR Docket Mar. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480fdbec2&disposition=at-
tachment&contentType=pdf (“Private citizens, even if they aren’t subject to a regulation, are
still directly and indirectly affected by it.”).
196. See Mendelson, supra note 194, at 416–17.
197. See infra Section II.B.2.b.
198. Comment of Ioana Rusu, Regulatory Counsel, Consumers Union 2 (OFR Docket
June 1, 2012) [hereinafter Comment of Consumers Union], available at http://www.regula-
tions.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006481023c16&disposition=attachment&content
Type=pdf.
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The cost of accessing standards substantially interferes with the notice regu-
latory beneficiaries receive of regulatory law.
Moreover, the content, not just the simple existence, of regulatory stan-
dards,199 might prompt parents to buy—or not buy—certain toys or infant
carriers; consumers to buy—or not buy—rice that contains some level of
arsenic; people considering employment in an OSHA-regulated paint booth
to work there—or not; and residents to drink filtered or bottled water de-
pending on the stringency of tap water standards.200 As an individual com-
menter wrote to the OFR, “I don’t have to follow any laws about the design
of airbags, but I have a right to know against what standards they are evalu-
ated.”201 A neighbor might, for example, view nuclear facility or oil pipeline
standards, even if complied with, as inadequately protective and still choose
to relocate. Thus, a regulatory standard can both affect the quality of choices
facing beneficiaries and function as a form of information disclosure regard-
ing these choices. The content of the standard directly impacts the interests
of regulatory beneficiaries. Accordingly, if notice is to be effective, meaning-
ful public access must be provided to anyone potentially affected by the law,
not just to those who must comply.202
2. Accountability for Legislative and Quasi-legislative Actions
In addition to the need for both regulated entities and regulatory benefi-
ciaries to have notice of the content of IBR standards, regulatory standards
also need to be readily and publicly available so that citizens can hold the
199. This would include an assessment that regulated entities are likely to comply with
binding standards; if compliance were not assured, regulatory beneficiary behavior might, of
course, change further still.
200. For example, lack of access might prevent consumers from making informed deci-
sions on whether to drink tap water when an agency relies on privately specified methodolo-
gies to test water sources. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 141.21(f)(8) (2012) (drinking water standards
incorporating numerous private standards for measurement of fecal coliform bacteria by
reference).
201. Comment of A Concerned Citizen, supra note 195.
202. Some might argue that mediating organizations such as newspapers or nongovern-
mental organizations might provide consumers or other individual beneficiaries with informa-
tion even if the individual beneficiaries cannot afford access. This is possible, of course, but it
is not a universal solution. Newspapers are limited in terms of both budgets and space; they
are unlikely to report either the content or the range of issues potentially raised by the over
9,000 SDO rules. Nongovernmental organizations need financial support and they under-
represent diffusely held preferences among large groups of individuals. In theory, individuals
whose budget constraints preclude them from accessing SDO standards could pool their funds
to enable a nongovernmental organization to purchase the standards and report issues to
them. But the organizational challenges and free-rider problems surrounding such an effort
are substantial. Public.Resource.Org, for example, ran a Kickstarter campaign to raise $100,000
to purchase (and publish directly) SDO rules; although the campaign did attract several hun-
dred participants, the organization only raised about a third of what it sought. See Carl
Malamud, Public.Resource.Org, Public Safety Codes of the World: Stand up for Safety!, Kick-
Starter, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/publicresource/public-safety-codes-of-the-
world-stand-up-for-safe/posts/641022 (last updated Oct. 25, 2013).
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government accountable both for complying with the law and for devising
it.
Perhaps to state the obvious, regulatory standards (as well as statutory
standards) are among the longest-lasting, highest-impact exercises of power
by government. They cover virtually every area of governmental power, ap-
ply to entire classes of entities and individuals, and have prospective, legally
binding effect until the government takes further action to repeal them. As a
group, then, legislative and quasi-legislative actions are the core activities
that distribute the benefits and burdens of government.
As with any governmental action, the development of regulatory stan-
dards is susceptible to abuse and malfeasance. These problems can range
from an agency’s imposition of arbitrary requirements203 to the issuance of
rules aimed at benefiting something—or someone—other than the public
interest. Accountability is thus critical to deterring agency violations of law
and arbitrariness, to safeguarding against “capture” or the undue influence
of any particular subgroup,204 to inhibiting reliance on inadequate or biased
information, and to addressing a range of other governance problems. In
addition, agencies need to be accountable for implementing their statutorily
delegated authority, carrying out the programs Congress created. Both regu-
lated entities and regulatory beneficiaries have a stake in proper agency im-
plementation of statutory programs. Finally, accountability mechanisms
help ensure that agencies, whose top officials are not elected, nonetheless
make democratically responsive decisions.
IBR rules are not formally secret. Their cost and the difficulty of acces-
sing them, however, represent significant impediments to accountability. As-
sessing whether public access is sufficient to ensure accountability requires
considering the nature of the governmental action, how accountability
mechanisms should function, and who requires access to invoke those ac-
countability mechanisms. In the IBR setting, several considerations make
clear that meaningful access must be broadly available to the public, not
simply to those who can afford the cost of the standards charged by the
SDOs.
a. Transparency, Consent, Voting, and Public Discussion
At the highest theoretical level, the notion that laws must be transparent
to the public can first be grounded in a notion of popular sovereignty—if
“the people” delegate power to the government, the actions the government
203. See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, N.Y. Times, Court Halts Ban on Large Sodas in
New York City, Mar. 12, 2013, at A1 (noting a judge’s decision to overturn the New York Board
of Health’s “soda ban” as “arbitrary and capricious”), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/12/nyregion/judge-invalidates-bloombergs-soda-ban.html. See generally Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461 (2004).
204. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through In-
stitutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15 (2010).
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takes must be open to the public.205 Otherwise, consent to be governed—
however it may be communicated—cannot be meaningful.206 If we focus on
voting (more on this below), a citizen cannot cast an informed vote regard-
ing incumbents without access to information regarding governmental ac-
tions. And if we take a more deliberative understanding of government,
governmental reasoning and decisionmaking must be readily available to the
public as a predicate for public discussion.207 These notions apply equally to
any sort of governmental exercise of power, whether it is focused on a single
case or broadly to an entire class.
For legislative and quasi-legislative decisions in particular, these demo-
cratic mechanisms are the key safeguards against governmental malfeasance.
For example, unlike criminal and civil enforcement proceedings, no consti-
tutional due process requirements attach to the enactment of statutes or the
promulgation of rules. As Justice Holmes reasoned in Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. State Board of Equalization, “Where a rule of conduct applies to more
than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct
voice in its adoption.”208 It surely is impractical. Accordingly, individuals
potentially affected by, say, the preparation of an automotive safety rule gen-
erally do not receive individual notice or an opportunity to be heard.209
(And indeed, they could only take advantage of such opportunities if they
could readily learn what was at issue.)
Legislative rules are also understood to require fewer individualized pro-
cedural safeguards because they apply to classes, rather than individuals, and
these groups can band together to exercise political power.210 As Holmes
observed, given the practical obstacles that would attend hearing rights, the
“only way” to protect the rights of an individual against the potential of state
205. E.g., Circular No. A-130, supra note 75, para. 7(c) (“The free flow of information
between the government and the public is essential to a democratic society.”).
206. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 885, 896 (2006) (“Lib-
eral philosophers who assume a contractual relationship between government and its citizens
presume that openness enables individuals to grant their informed consent to be governed.”
(citing John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 16, 454 (1971))); David Mitchell Ivester, Note, The
Constitutional Right to Know, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 109, 116 (1977) (“[T]he right to know
is implicit in the structure of a self-governing system. The sovereign people, by virtue of their
station as the fundamental source of all governmental power, have an inherent right to know
what their government is doing.”).
207. Fenster, supra note 206, at 902.
208. 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
209. See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 284 (1984). Adminis-
trative experimentation with formal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 553, 556–57 (2012), in which interested parties do receive an opportunity to be
heard in a trial-type hearing (if not personalized notice), has been largely abandoned after
formal rulemaking turned out to be extremely cumbersome and time-consuming. See, e.g.,
Stephen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 548–49 (7th ed.
2011) (noting that there is a “gathering consensus” against formal rulemaking).
210. In addition, in the legislative setting, imposing procedural requirements raises the
unpleasant specter of judicial interference with a coordinate and coequal branch of govern-
ment. See, e.g., Minn. State Bd., 465 U.S. at 284–85. Due process, however, of course applies to
any effort to enforce these standards or extract fines or penalties for noncompliance.
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power to affect her person or property would be through the power of indi-
viduals “immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.”211 Holmes
was probably referring to the power to vote, and in the context of federal
agencies, the vote means, primarily, the presidential election.212
This is not to say that limited public access around more narrowly fo-
cused governmental decisions is acceptable—that issue is beyond the scope
of this Article.213 However, with respect to legislative and quasi-legislative
decisions, public access clearly cannot be incidental, occasional, or selective.
Instead, citizens must have widespread and easy access to the relevant legis-
lative and quasi-legislative decisions. Conceivably, an energetic reporter, par-
ticularly one based in Washington, D.C., could read some of the thousands
of IBR rules and decide to cover the issues, prompting public debate. But in
general, the access costs that SDOs charge burden reporters as well as indi-
viduals. And the prospect of occasional newspaper coverage on topics se-
lected by a reporter cannot be a substitute for a voter’s opportunity to
become informed on governmental lawmaking.214 Thus, even if these docu-
ments are not formally secret, the substantial obstacles to public accessibility
undermine the potential of voting or public deliberation as a means of
accountability.
Elections, whether for the president or for Congress, represent a far-
from-perfect means of communicating citizen views on either statutes or
regulatory decisions; elections are infrequent, choices are limited, and voter
preferences may not be well formed at the time of election.215 But elections
cannot function at all as a means of accountability for legislative or quasi-
legislative decisions if an interested citizen cannot readily discover the con-
tent of these decisions.
b. Agency Decisionmaking and Procedures as an Accountability Mechanism
for IBR Rules
As Professor Farina has observed, “No single mode of democratic legiti-
mation can serve to mediate between the conflicted, protean, often inchoate
will of the people and the modern regulatory enterprise.”216 Thus, our cur-
rent system relies on a set of accountability mechanisms for agency rules,
including rulemaking procedures, oversight, and judicial review, that go far
211. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 445.
212. See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
213. Cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) (explaining
that the First Amendment required opening a criminal trial to both the press and general
public).
214. Similarly, the prospect that a nongovernmental organization might supply infor-
mation on some SDO rules to the public is not a substitute for the ability of an interested
individual to read the rule that is of interest to her.
215. See generally Nina Mendelson, Foreword, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of
E-Mail, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1343, 1352–53 (2011).
216. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex
World, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 987, 988 (1997).
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beyond the indirect control of the electoral process. Meanwhile, agency in-
corporation of private standards, a form of collaborative governance, can
present distinctive pitfalls. I turn to these issues and the accompanying need
for meaningful public availability of the text of agency rules, including pri-
vately drafted rules.
i. The Use of IBR Rules as a Form of Collaborative Governance
Incorporation by reference of private standards is only one of a growing
group of governmental actions that enlist private entities and institutions in
public governance functions. Such “collaborative governance” ranges from
self-regulation to private accreditation organizations that certify organic
food217 to the privatization of prisons.218 Collaborative governance presents
well-recognized challenges for accountability regimes.219 In the outsourcing
setting, for example, private actors may be subject to fewer restrictions, in-
cluding procedural and ethics requirements, than their governmental coun-
terparts.220 On occasion, as Professor Michaels has written, government may
enlist private parties with the goal of avoiding these same restrictions.221 The
SDO process represents a collaborative approach to rulemaking, but not one
governed by contract. One insight offered by the collaborative governance
literature is that these sorts of departures from conventional decisionmaking
modes, such as legislating or rulemaking, require a thoughtful approach to
accountability. To assure that, ultimately, decisions are both democratically
responsive and well reasoned, accountability regimes need to be sensitive to
the particular characteristics of the collaborative arrangement. These charac-
teristics can include the identity of the persons and institutions involved, the
decisionmaking procedures they use (and who controls the details and func-
tions of those procedures), who has a stake in the decision, and how the
institutions relate to each other, together with the particular risks faced in
the process of collaboration.222 And these mechanisms of accountability, in
turn, require a thoughtful approach to transparency and public access.
217. See Lesley K. McAllister, Third Party Programs to Assess Regulatory
Compliance 33–38 (2012), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Third-Party-Programs-Report_Final.pdf; Chenglin Liu, Is “USDA Organic” a Seal of Deceit?:
The Pitfalls of USDA Certified Organics Produced in the United States, China and Beyond, 47
Stan. J. Int’l L. 333 (2011).
218. See generally Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of
Punishment, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 149 (2010).
219. See generally Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democ-
racy (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
220. See generally Kathleen Clark, Ethics, Employees and Contractors: Financial Conflicts
of Interest in and out of Government, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 961 (2011).
221. Agencies may sometimes rely on private entities to “work around” public-inter-
ested constraints that would otherwise apply, including disclosure, procedure, and substantive
constraints. See generally Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717
(2010).
222. E.g., Freeman, supra note 126, at 549 (proposing an approach of “ ‘aggregate’ ac-
countability,” including considering formal and informal mechanisms “emanating not just
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For example, Professor Clark has recently argued that secrecy hindered
accountability for legal violations in the executive branch in the Bush Ad-
ministration’s warrantless surveillance program that ran from 2001 to 2007.
She argues that “multiple overlapping accountability mechanisms” might
have deterred violations of law in this program. These mechanisms included
Office of Legal Counsel opinions, inspector general processes, and other in-
ternal procedures, along with congressional committee investigations.223
Every element of this apparently robust system of accountability for individ-
ual warrantless surveillance decisions, however, shared a “dependence on
information”224—information that was very difficult to get because of claims
that national security required secrecy.225
In the context of incorporating privately drafted rules by reference, the
central accountability issue is ensuring—even while the government saves
resources and utilizes valuable private sector expertise—that the government
makes proper use of incorporated material and that adopted standards do,
in fact, protect the public interest as required and defined by statute. Like
any duly promulgated agency rule, then, an SDO standard that an agency
incorporates by reference ought to be justified by proper reasons and be
democratically responsive.226 And we must also consider who should be able
to invoke these accountability mechanisms and how effective they are.227 In
the IBR setting, the affected parties seeking accountability include both reg-
ulated entities and those who expect to benefit from the way the government
regulates others.228
ii. Rulemaking Pitfalls, the Use of IBR Rules, and the Lack of
Public Access
A key form of accountability for agency rules is, of course, the agency
rulemaking process itself. As discussed, that process can prompt the agency
to ventilate a range of issues, including issues raised by the public in com-
ments, and to prepare an explanation—the “concise general statement of
their basis and purpose”—of the choices made.229 The process of rulemaking
and the record the agency creates can in turn facilitate meaningful judicial
review. Agencies use rulemaking to adopt SDO rules that will be incorpo-
rated by reference. Thus, in theory, rulemaking could serve as a sort of qual-
ity assurance for incorporated SDO rules.
from government supervision, but from independent third parties and regulated entities,” and
addressing both particular risks and distinctive capacities of involved parties).
223. Clark, supra note 52, at 404–07.
224. Id. at 404.
225. Id.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 203–204.
227. See Jerry Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the
Grammar of Governance, in Public Accountability: Dilemmas, Designs, and Experiences
115 (Michael Dowdle ed., 2006).
228. See Mendelson, supra note 194, at 416–17.
229. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
March 2014] Private Control over Access to the Law 777
Under the best of circumstances, however, the potential of rulemaking
to air the relevant issues and to reveal agency reasoning is a limited one.
Particularly given the limitations of SDOs’ internal processes, an agency’s
reliance on SDOs to develop a rule for incorporation can worsen the diffi-
culties. Widespread public access to agency rulemaking is thus critical for
the process to provide any meaningful assurance that standards chosen will
be well reasoned and democratically responsive.
First, even when under agency control from start to finish, the rulemak-
ing process is far from risk-free. Even the most publicly focused regulatory
official, in an agency-led regulatory process, may lack full information. The
agency tendency has been toward dependence on the information and coop-
eration of regulated industries. Regulated industries may, as a practical mat-
ter, have greater informal access to agency decisionmaking processes, raising
concerns about “capture” and information gaps.230 For example, it is widely
documented that so-called regulatory beneficiaries tend to be under-
represented in agency proceedings because they are less well organized and
may have less political clout. Moreover, agencies may simply be less aware of
their identities than those of regulated entities, with whom they have re-
peated interactions in gathering information and assessing compliance with
agency rules.231 This underrepresentation can be particularly problematic
during the so-called “pre-notice” period, understood to be a key time for
rulemaking. The core of an agency’s rule proposal will be developed infor-
mally and internally prior to the publication of the Notice of Proposed
230. See Mendelson, supra note 194, at 424–33; Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency
With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 79,
86 (2012) (“[N]otice and comment is typically dominated by a limited number of high-caliber
professional interest groups and industry representatives.”).
231. Mendelson, supra note 194, at 427; Richard Murphy, Essay, Enhancing the Role of
Public Interest Organizations in Rulemaking Via Pre-notice Transparency, 47 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 681, 689–91 (2012) (noting the vast disparity between industry and beneficiary commu-
nications with the agency); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study
of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 99, 102 (2011) [hereinafter Wagner et
al., Rulemaking in the Shade]; see also Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation
and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 429, 464 (1999) (noting that regu-
lated entities typically have an “advantage in influencing agency decisions” because they have
the “incentive and means to monitor what the agency does on a day-to-day basis” and “infor-
mation without which a regulatory agency cannot do its job”); Wendy E. Wagner, Administra-
tive Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 Duke L.J. 1321, 1417 (2010) (suggesting
that agencies raise the public visibility of certain rulemaking procedures as a mechanism to
increase public participation) [hereinafter Wagner, Administrative Law].
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Rule.232 During that period, regulated entities may have disproportionate in-
fluence within the agency.233 The presence of an agency official’s ulterior
motive could worsen the problem.234
Once an agency has published a proposed rule in the Federal Register, it
administers a notice-and-comment process that is formally open to any “in-
terested person.”235 People are entitled to submit comments and, under cur-
rent case law, to have agencies respond to significant comments.236 In
addition, any “interested person” can petition an agency to revise or repeal a
rule.237 Both regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries, as well as gener-
ally interested members of the public, can use these mechanisms to demand
reasons from the agency regarding the agency’s decision to adopt—or not
adopt—a particular rule. This process has been praised as making the ad-
ministrative state a far more “civic republican” entity than other American
institutions.238
Even for standards an agency itself develops, with full data disclosure in
the rulemaking process, however, this formally open process can be flawed.
For example, an agency may, as a practical matter, have committed to cer-
tain regulatory approaches during the pre-notice period while ruling others
out. Comments may thus be less likely to provoke a genuine change in the
agency’s thinking. This precommitment issue is problematic because, as
noted, the agency may disproportionately receive (or solicit) feedback from
some quarters during the pre-notice period.239
232. E.g., Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administra-
tive Rulemaking, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 589, 600–01 (2002) (noting that a variety of sources,
including industry insiders, lawyers, and empirical studies, agree that pre-notice contacts can
be more effective in influencing agency policy than post-notice comments).
233. Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade, supra note 231, at 102; see also Murphy,
supra note 231, at 689 (during the pre-notice period, EPA officials had an average of 178
contacts per rule with interested parties; 170 were with regulated parties, and the remaining
contacts were mainly from states, with fewer than one contact on average with public interest
groups).
234. Public choice theories of agency official behavior posit, for example, that an
agency official may be “tempted to curry favor with prospective employers or clients while still
employed by the government.” Christopher N. Camponovo, Indecent Proposal: Abraham
Sofaer, Libya, and the Appearance of Impropriety, 21 J. Legal Prof. 23, 27 (1997); Marc T. Law
& Cheryl X. Long, What Do Revolving-Door Laws Do?, 55 J.L. & Econ. 421, 421 (2012) (“Plans
to pursue a subsequent career in the private sector may induce current public employees (for
instance, regulators) to treat potential private sector employers favorably.”).
235. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
236. Id.; Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393–94 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(noting that agencies must respond to comments that “step over a threshold requirement of
materiality”).
237. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
238. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 1511 (1992).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 231–233.
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These procedural difficulties increase when the agency chooses to incor-
porate a standard developed by a private SDO. Again, some SDOs are for-
mally composed of experts or professionals. Others, however, may be
organized expressly to protect regulated industry interests. Meanwhile, an
SDO may function through relatively closed procedures.240 These character-
istics raise concerns about whether SDO standard drafters will be overly
dependent on information from a narrow category of stakeholders.
Moreover, many laws that constrain agencies simply do not apply to
SDOs. This raises the risk that an SDO standard will diverge from public
goals. To begin with, it is difficult to tell what criteria an SDO drafting
“safety” standards is asked to achieve. For example, ANSI standard A14.5-
2007 for ladders states that it is aimed at “safe construction, design, testing,
care, and use of portable reinforced plastic ladders.”241 It is unclear whether
this objective is intended, as the OSHA requirements are, to “assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions,”242 or even to create standards “reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment.”243
Other laws intended to ensure the integrity of agency processes do not
apply to SDOs. For example, ethical requirements do not apply. As Professor
Clark has recently detailed, “A criminal statute prohibits Executive Branch
officials from participating in matters that would affect their own financial
interests or the financial interests of family members[ or] organizations with
which they are associated . . . . Employees must recuse themselves from
participating even when they have only small financial interests at stake.”244
The presence of a financial interest would not limit an individual or com-
pany from filing a public comment either to an SDO or directly to an agency
on a draft rule. But no ethical restrictions apply to SDO employees engaged
in drafting.245 So, for example, it is largely up to internal self-regulation
whether members in the American Public Health Association who draft
drinking water test requirements or automotive engineers who draft safety
240. See, e.g., Comment of Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers, supra note 73, at 2 (expressing
concern that with incorporation by reference, “an open rulemaking process would be replaced
by the need to work through the publication parties to initiate changes”); supra text accompa-
nying notes 95–128; supra note 221 and accompanying text (on Michaels’s argument on the
government’s use of privatization as a “work-around”).
241. Standard available at ANSI ASC A14.5-2007, Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., http://
webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=ANSI+ASC+A14.5-2007&source=safety_landing#.
UUcs8Bzvt8E (last visited Sept.29, 2013).
242. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006).
243. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8); see supra text accompanying notes 129–132.
244. Clark, supra note 220, at 968–69.
245. See id. at 969–70.
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standards for the Society for Automotive Engineers can have a pending pat-
ent application or a financial investment that could be affected by a stan-
dard’s content. Meanwhile, SDOs themselves often derive substantial
support from industry membership fees.246
Further, although SDOs may strive to implement detailed internal
processes for standards development and drafting, SDOs are not subject to
the FOIA or the APA because those statutes apply only to “agencies.”247 So
the APA’s public participation requirements for rulemaking do not apply,
and neither do the APA’s or the FOIA’s requirements of explanation and
data disclosure.248 The extent to which there will be participation, explana-
tion, or disclosure is left up to the SDO. Finally, APA constraints do not
apply to an SDO’s revocation of its standards, although they would clearly
bind an agency to amend or repeal an existing rule through established
rulemaking procedures.249
As a practical matter, opportunities for the ordinary citizen to partici-
pate in SDO processes are limited, and participation is significantly more
difficult than in the agency process. Some SDOs, notably ASTM, do outline
procedures that, formally, invite wide engagement and that aim, ambi-
tiously, to provide a balance of viewpoints in the decisionmaking process.250
Realistically, however, one may have to “pay to play” in SDO processes,
whether it is by joining the group or traveling to a meeting to participate in
person.251 At least one SDO, the NAESB, has described its “balanced pro-
cess” as “balanced . . . by market segment” of industry, and inclusive with
respect to those who may have to “implement” standards it develops.252 It is
unclear whether this balance extends at all to participation by regulatory
beneficiaries and the general public. Further, having to purchase the draft
standard—or the underlying standard if amendments are being consid-
ered—often represents a substantial financial obstacle to participation. Fi-
nally, figuring out which of many SDOs may be developing relevant
standards, what sorts of processes they are running, and how to participate
246. See, e.g., N. Am. Energy Standards Bd., Member Homepage Access Form
(n.d.), available at http://www.naesb.org/pdf/Homepage.pdf (“Members have access to the
work products on the protected areas as part of their membership benefits.”); Comment of
Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., supra note 33, at 2 (“Some organizations receive revenue through
membership support . . . .”). Membership to the North American Energy Standards Board
costs $7,000 per year. N. Am. Energy Standards Bd., Membership Application (2011),
available at http://www.naesb.org/pdf4/naesbapp.pdf.
247. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(a) (2012) (defining “agency”); id. § 552 (applying information
disclosure requirements to agencies); id. § 553 (applying rulemaking requirements to agen-
cies). In addition, the Federal Advisory Committee Act does not apply to SDOs. See Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16.
248. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring notice-and-comment process and “concise general
statement of their basis and purpose”).
249. Id. § 551(5) (defining “rule making” to include “agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule”).
250. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 110–115 (ANSI standards).
251. Strauss, supra note 2, at 541; see supra text accompanying notes 105–108.
252. Comment of N. Am. Energy Standards Bd., supra note 45, at 1.
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may tax the informational and financial resources of a citizen, a business, or
even a small organization. Small businesses complained about just this prob-
lem when Congress enacted the NTTAA.253 In short, the SDO processes sim-
ply cannot be viewed as an effective substitute for the participatory and
reason-giving requirements provided by agency rulemaking.
So, might an agency’s notice-and-comment rulemaking process prior to
incorporating an SDO standard compensate for the lack of SDO process?
Unfortunately, if an interested citizen or entity has not been able to partici-
pate in the SDO process, the chance of having the agency meaningfully con-
sider these views in the rulemaking process seems smaller still. The lack of
meaningful public access hinders rulemaking from compensating for the
procedural difficulties of the SDO process.
First, in the agency rulemaking process, the rule itself and the data sup-
porting the rule may be copyrighted by the SDO and available only on pay-
ment, limiting the usefulness of the comment opportunity.254 Further, as
Bremer makes clear, under many circumstances the IBR determination is
not made until the final rule stage, further limiting the comment opportu-
nity.255 Once an agency has made the final decision to incorporate a rule, the
IBR material, again, is typically available only on payment to the SDO; this
would obviously impede an “interested person” from invoking the petition
process to ask the agency to repeal or revise the rule.256 For example, the
National Tank Truck Carriers filed a comment noting these barriers to com-
ment in the agency rulemaking process on IBR rules on hazardous materials
transportation.257
Moreover, agency precommitment issues are likely to be even worse for
SDO rules than for agency-drafted rules. This is because the material has
been fully developed and drafted elsewhere, as well as “endorsed” by the
developing group as a package. And as noted above, the purpose of both
Circular No. A-119 and the NTTAA was to reduce complexity from govern-
mental standards that overlap with, but that cover largely similar ground to,
privately developed standards. This is not to say that agencies will automati-
cally incorporate a private standard if one is available.258 But agencies would
253. See supra note 123.
254. See, e.g., supra note 135–138 and accompanying text.
255. See Bremer, supra note 10, at 144 (“OFR does not get involved in evaluating an
incorporating regulation until it is final and ready to be promulgated.”).
256. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012).
257. See Comment of Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers, supra note 73, at 2 (noting that an
SDO was initially permitted to charge for access to IBR standards undergoing notice and
comment, but following a complaint, PHMSA ultimately “required the two private agencies to
make portions of their copyrighted publications available electronically while the comment
period was open”).
258. E.g., Mary F. Donaldson & Nathalie Rioux, Nat’l Inst. of Standards and
Tech., NISTIR 7789, Fourteenth Annual Report on Federal Agency Use of Voluntary
Consensus Standards and Conformity Assessment 3 (2011), available at https://stan-
dards.gov/NTTAA/resources/nttaa_ar_2010.pdf (cataloging forty-eight uses of government-
unique standards in lieu of private sector standards).
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seem to have a strong incentive, if they are going to adopt IBR standards at
all, to adopt them as a whole, rather than tweaking them. Modifications to
SDO standards might be criticized as creating complexity and duplication,
contrary to the purposes of Circular No. A-119 and the NTTAA. Indeed,
digital searching in the CFR for private IBR standards that have been modi-
fied or changed seems to confirm this incentive for agencies. Searching has
identified only eighteen agency rules, out of thousands, in which an agency
both incorporated private SDO standards and modified them to some de-
gree.259 This suggests that agencies may be reluctant to respond to comments
by revising SDO standards they are proposing to incorporate by reference.
I do not wish to suggest that public standard setting will generally be
superior to private standard setting. Public standard setting can have its own
difficulties, ranging from agency tunnel vision260 to decisions made by offi-
cials whose personal motivations conflict with the public interest.261 And
although the problem may be more moderate compared with the SDO set-
ting, unbalanced participation of interested parties remains an issue in the
public setting.262 Meanwhile, private processes can offer important expertise
and services to agencies. But there are surely significant potential pitfalls in
this collaborative governance process, and they underscore the importance
of ensuring that we have functional accountability mechanisms.
Agency rulemaking depends on inviting “any interested person” to par-
ticipate. For it to serve as a functional accountability mechanism when an
agency elects to incorporate an SDO standard, the SDO standard has to be
meaningfully available, as does the data supporting it. During the comment
period, the SDO rule may not even be available in the OFR; the only way to
obtain it may be by contacting the SDO and paying a fee. That the rule is
not formally secret does not suffice; the fees charged by SDOs obviously
obstruct public access and undermine rulemaking’s potential as an account-
ability mechanism.
c. Internal Accountability: Agency Adoption of SDO Standards
As Professor Mashaw points out, however, accountability for public gov-
ernance regimes need not always fit the conventional mold of an agency
preparing to present its reasoning in a judicial review process invoked by
259. In March 2013, the following Westlaw search was performed in the CFR database:
“(incorp! /2 reference) /s (modif! change).” The search turned up 137 documents, seventeen of
which represented agency modifications of an incorporated private SDO standard. Six of the
regulatory modifications relate to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; eleven relate to
other SDO standards. Search results are on file with the author. Additionally, shortly before
this piece went to press, the CPSC incorporated an SDO standard on infant carriers which the
agency modified somewhat. See supra note 72 (on infant carrier standards).
260. E.g., Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 11–19 (1993).
261. Shapiro, supra note 126, at 399 (noting that agency officials may seek to maximize
“money, security, status, and policy that may or may not align with the interests of
Congress”).
262. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 194, at 424–33; cf. Freeman, supra note 126, at 558
(noting the extent to which private actors already permeate the public sector).
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outsiders. One might object, then, that we should take a wider frame and
consider other mechanisms that require an entity—such as the SDO—to
account for its actions according to some standard or set of preferences, and
in which consequences flow if the action does not measure up.263
Thus, a possible internal accountability mechanism could be the
agency’s decision whether to utilize the SDO standard at all. An agency offi-
cial who views the substance of an SDO standard as inadequate or the SDO’s
standard-issuing process as flawed could simply decline to propose incorpo-
ration by reference and instead develop a standard in-house. (If the declined
standard could be characterized as a voluntary consensus standard, however,
the official would have to file an explanation of reasons with the OMB264 and
the National Institute of Standards and Technology.265) The agency official’s
role might be likened to that of a supervisor in a hierarchical management
structure. The supervisor’s control over subordinates, as Mashaw points out,
may operate as a safeguard against malfeasance.266 If such a mechanism were
to be effective, perhaps outside accountability mechanisms—and the public
access to IBR rules that would be required to support them—would be less
necessary.
On closer analysis of institutional incentives, however, this decisionmak-
ing seems insufficient to provide the needed accountability. This is because
agency officials face significant incentives to rely on IBR material even when
IBR standards are not ideal from the standpoint of statutory implementa-
tion and do not serve, in Freeman’s words, “the ultimate consumer”267—
including substantive IBR standards that might be considered “politically
contentious.”268
A first worry is that incorporation by reference of SDO rules could be a
mechanism for regulated entities, through SDOs they dominate, to “cap-
ture” agency officials. Again, “capture” is a term with myriad meanings, en-
compassing (but not limited to) the situation in which agencies “depend too
much on the industries they regulate for information, political support, or
guidance.”269 If this circumstance is present, SDO rules could amount to a
supply for agencies of regulated-entity-friendly, rather than public-inter-
ested, rules. “Captured” agency officials could elect to adopt such standards
wholesale. Relying on agency decisionmaking obviously then would not
guard against poor SDO standards.
263. See Mashaw, supra note 227, at 117–20.
264. Circular No. A-119, supra note 60, para. 6(d).
265. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 § 12(d)(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 272 note (2012) (Utilization of Consensus Technical Standards by Federal Agencies).
266. Mashaw, supra note 227, at 120.
267. Freeman, supra note 126, at 605 (noting that “[e]ven a well-meaning agency may
be torn between competing goals,” and its interests “may not (and often will not) coincide
with that of the ultimate consumer”).
268. Comment of Am. Petroleum Inst., supra note 25, at 4 (characterizing IBR rules
subject to OFR supervision).
269. Nicholas Bagley, Response, Agency Hygiene, 89 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 1, 5 (2010),
available at http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Bagley-89-TLRSA-1.pdf.
784 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:737
Agency motivations are undoubtedly far more complex, as are the prod-
ucts of SDO processes. Even without “capture,” however, as then-Professor
Kagan observed, “[F]ew could argue with [interest group theory’s] basic in-
sight—that well-organized groups ha[ve] the potential to exercise dispropor-
tionate influence over agency policymaking by virtue of the resources they
command[ ], the information they possess[ ], and the long-term relations
they maintain[ ] with agency officials.”270
For an agency official, an SDO rule represents the packaging of interest
group resources, expertise, and information in an extraordinarily usable
form.271 Even the most public-interested agency official,272 then, is likely to
be interested in the significant resource savings from adoption of SDO rules,
including rules that represent less-than-perfect implementation of statutory
commands. Issuing a rule requires time, resources, and the development and
application of internal expertise (which itself requires time and resources).
Agencies often seek private sector assistance on regulatory standards through
contracts with consultants. SDO standards represent a supply of fully
drafted standards informed by private sector expertise and, often, privately
developed supporting data.273 The agency receives the work without the fi-
nancial obligation of a contract, although agencies may still supply some
financial support to an SDO.274 And although an agency must still generally
evaluate the SDO standard prior to proposing incorporation and convene a
notice-and-comment process, that process typically represents only a por-
tion of the processes required to develop a rule.275
Further, the internal ability of agencies to oversee the standards—and to
decline to incorporate them—can be inhibited by a number of factors. A
270. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2265 (2001).
271. E.g., Bremer, supra note 10, at 140 (“Using voluntary consensus standards . . . .
allows agencies to capitalize on considerable expertise and resources available outside
government.”).
272. This, of course, assumes that agency officials themselves want standards that serve
the public interest; to the extent that they have other motivations, such as maximizing oppor-
tunities for later private sector positions at an SDO or a regulated entity, the problem is worse
still. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 126, at 399–400 (in analyzing government “outsourcing,” assum-
ing agency regulators generally want to accomplish congressional goals).
273. E.g., Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 77
Fed. Reg. 31,086 (proposed May 24, 2012) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 1112, 1118) (noting
that ASTM is in possession of studies supporting XRF technology).
274. See Circular No. A-119, supra note 60.
275. E.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-295, Federal Rulemaking:
Improvements Needed to Monitoring and Evaluation of Rules Development as Well
as to the Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews 13 (2009), available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d09205.pdf (stating that, in addition to the extensive work required to de-
velop a proposed rule, “[a]gency officials reported that . . . initial [pre-proposal] work on a
rule is of indeterminate length and sometimes constitutes a major portion of the process”); cf.
Comment of Am. Petroleum Inst., supra note 25, at 3 (“In the event that a private standards
development organization declined to make its standards available online for free . . . the
rejection of the incorporation by reference would force the regulatory agency to either refrain
from rulemaking or expend agency time and resources to duplicate already existing private
resources.”).
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significant appeal of using private standards is that they permit agencies to
build on private expertise, rather than having to pay the costs of developing
extensive in-house expertise. By the same token, however, if more expertise
in fact resides in the private sector, the agency may find it costlier to fully
evaluate whether the privately developed standard meets public goals.276
Moreover, once an agency has developed a pattern of relying on pri-
vately generated standards, an agency may find it more difficult to modify or
reject those standards, even if that is otherwise advisable, because the pro-
cess of devising or locating replacement standards may have a higher initial
cost than if the agency had a well-established regulatory program of its
own.277
Besides potential resource savings, pragmatic political concerns also may
nudge an agency to adopt an SDO standard rather than draft a “govern-
ment-unique” standard. To the extent that regulated entities play important
roles in developing SDO rules and SDO rules track regulated entity prefer-
ences, agencies might expect less resistance to the rule and greater compli-
ance.278 For example, SDO standards might reflect regulated entities’
currently adopted technologies and thus correlate with higher levels of com-
pliance than, say, a performance standard that is effectively technology forc-
ing.279 For an analogous example, Strauss describes the efforts of American
firms attempting to establish a U.S.-focused standard for optics as an Inter-
national Standards Organization (“ISO”) standard; European firms, how-
ever, concerned about potential losses from a U.S.-focused technology
requirement, dominated that process, resulting in an ISO standard “much
closer to European preferences.”280
Agencies might also expect fewer hassles from political overseers,
whether in Congress or the White House.281 It is not controversial that regu-
lated entities tend to be quite well represented in these settings.282 Agency
adoption of SDO standards may reduce regulated entity complaints to Con-
gress or the White House because the rules incorporating private standards
276. Shapiro, supra note 126, at 405, 411.
277. Id. at 410–11 (discussing holdup problem).
278. Seidenfeld, supra note 231, at 464 (“[A]dministrators have a strong incentive to
cooperate with entities directly subject to their regulatory decisions and other interest groups
that regularly participate in the agency’s proceedings.”).
279. E.g., Bremer, supra note 10, at 140 (“[R]egulated parties are often already comply-
ing [with private standards]. This reduces the discrepancy between industry practice and fed-
eral regulation . . . .”); Comment of R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President of Gov’t Affairs,
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. 2 (OFR Docket Apr. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Comment of
Chamber of Commerce], available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=
0900006480feb794&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (stating that incorporation of
SDO standards “provides certainty and saves money for businesses, which are often either
involved with the formation of the standard or already in compliance”).
280. Strauss, supra note 2, at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).
281. E.g., Bagley, supra note 269, at 5 (“[I]ndustry effectively leverages its influence
with those elected officials responsible for overseeing the agency . . . .”).
282. Murphy, supra note 231, at 687 & n.33 (“A common criticism of OIRA review is
that it is secretive and generally favors regulated interests.”).
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are better for the public-interested reasons articulated in the legislative his-
tory to the NTTAA—less complexity and potential duplication, compared
with the layering of government-unique standards over voluntary consensus
standards.283 Or the standards might better reflect technology already in use,
taking advantage of private sector knowledge. More ambiguously, the risk of
political backlash might be reduced if SDO standards simply demand less of
regulated entities or better track their preferred resource allocation. And
once politically powerful industries become vested in a private standard-
setting process, it may be more difficult for agencies to shift to government-
unique standards.284 Further, while the OMB exercises significant oversight
of agency rules through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”), official OMB policy, as noted, already establishes a preference in
favor of incorporating voluntary consensus standards. This suggests that the
OMB too is interested in realizing the potential resource savings from adopt-
ing existing privately developed standards.285 The extent of OIRA review of
IBR rules is unclear.
All this assumes that agencies can often have discretion to select among
a range of regulatory standards that will satisfy statutory requirements, ena-
bling them to select a substantive SDO standard significantly different from
the standard the agency might have designed on its own. This assumption
seems eminently realistic. Statutes typically grant agencies quite broad regu-
latory discretion.286 Further, agency decisions receive deferential judicial re-
view.287 Indeed, Congress’s enactment of a statutory preference for voluntary
consensus standards in the NTTAA implicitly recognizes that agencies gener-
ally possess a range of regulatory choices.
Thus, federal agencies have significant incentives to incorporate by ref-
erence private standards that are separate from and potentially in tension
283. See supra text accompanying notes 63–65 (discussing concerns underlying NT-
TAA). Agency regulatory standards are subject only to ad hoc congressional oversight and
correction, oversight that is probably more likely to be triggered by well-organized, concen-
trated groups of regulated entities in any event. Seidenfeld, supra note 231, at 464 (“A regu-
lated entity frequently is a large corporation with resources to appeal agency decisions at every
level. . . . [R]egulated entities and special interest groups often contribute significantly to polit-
ical campaigns.”). Congress may also find reduced agency budget demands appealing.
284. Shapiro, supra note 126, at 411 (discussing accounting industry example; private
standards were not displaced by public ones until high-profile scandal).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 60–62 (regarding Circular No. A-119’s prefer-
ences for agency use of private standards). See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Politi-
cal” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127 (2010) (regarding significant
modifications to rules made in OMB–OIRA review of agency rules).
286. Mendelson, supra note 285, at 1128.
287. Courts will overturn an agency rule only if it is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary
to law, including required procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). The arbitrary and capricious
determination is obviously deferential, and under the Chevron and Skidmore doctrines, courts
also defer to agency interpretations of their governing statutes. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 228 (2001). It is unclear whether an interpretation of a statute that an SDO initially
developed and that an agency incorporated into a federal rule would be entitled to Chevron
deference.
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with statutory goals. This undermines the effectiveness of internal mecha-
nisms of accountability. And there is no other institution whose approval
must automatically be sought for the content of SDO standards and that
might have a strong incentive to guard against poor-quality SDO rules.288
d. External Accountability Mechanisms
Thus, we cannot readily rely on agency approval or, absent meaningful
public access, the rulemaking process to ensure that SDO-drafted standards
do properly implement authorizing statutes and serve the public interest.
What about external accountability mechanisms that concerned citizens and
entities could invoke? Such accountability mechanisms may be particularly
important for individual citizens, small entities, and regulatory beneficiaries
in general, who are affected by these standards but who also tend to be
underrepresented in the processes of both agencies and SDOs.289
For all the external accountability mechanisms, however, whether rea-
sons are demanded and consequences visited on an agency through the elec-
toral process, through congressional oversight or new legislation, through
White House oversight, or through judicial review, transparency remains a
necessary condition.290 And that transparency has to mean not just that in-
corporated SDO rules are not secret but also that their content is meaning-
fully available to the public.
So, for example, if individual consumers or groups, such as Consumers
Union, wish to “push for stronger and more protective standards for con-
sumers” under the Consumer Product Safety Act,291 they must, in their own
words, be able to have “easy and free access to relevant standards.”292 Again,
wherever we draw the line of “meaningful” public access, the imposition of
significant access costs by SDOs puts IBR rules on the wrong side.
Consider electoral accountability. As noted, this accountability mecha-
nism has intrinsic limitations because elections do not provide voters with
infinite choices.293 Assume, however, that voters have a reasonable range of
choices, say, in a presidential election, and that agency officials can be mean-
ingfully, if indirectly, held accountable in such an election.294 The public
must be well informed enough and its views on regulatory policy sufficiently
288. The OFR must approve incorporations by reference, but its approval authority
does not extend to substantive grounds. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 95–129, 231–234 (regarding SDOs and agen-
cies). Underrepresentation, of course, is a potential problem in Congress and the White House
as well. E.g., Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review,
1 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 209 (2012) (on the White House).
290. Clark, supra note 52, at 361–62 (first stage of accountability is through “inform-
ing”); Shkabatur, supra note 230.
291. E.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–84 (2012).
292. Comment of Consumers Union, supra note 198, at 2.
293. See supra text accompanying note 215.
294. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3147, 3155–56 (2010).
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developed so that regulatory policy decisions will be salient to an election.
The president must further have an incentive to implement those views
through agency supervision295 and through the appointment and removal of
top agency officials. While people have expressed doubts about various as-
pects of this accountability mechanism,296 ordinary citizens cannot even be-
gin to register their unhappiness with federal agency actions through the
presidential election if they cannot easily learn the content of binding rules.
Easy access to the rules’ content is also needed to effectuate other ac-
countability mechanisms, such as congressional actions that more specifi-
cally direct agency action or congressional oversight of statutory
implementation.297 Congressional oversight, while easier to obtain than new
legislation, is at best an imperfect accountability mechanism, since it tends
to be ad hoc, sometimes overly responsive to “well-organized interest
groups,” and may be conducted by unrepresentative submajorities.298 But to
the extent that congressional review of agency rules can have any useful ef-
fect, obstacles to access by the public and by Congress to the rules’ content
will obviously impair a congressional committee’s ability to perform any
meaningful oversight function, including by demanding an agency official’s
explanation of a regulatory decision. For example, during the Gulf oil spill, a
House of Representatives committee wishing to evaluate a federal pipeline
safety standard that incorporated by reference a standard drafted by the
295. White House supervision of agency rulemaking through the OIRA process appears
to result in significant numbers of changes to rules, although the content of these changes is
generally difficult to discern. See Mendelson, supra note 285.
296. Political accountability has meant “vesting of ultimate decisional authority in a
person who is elected.” Wells, supra note 182, at 628 (quoting Peter M. Shane, Political Ac-
countability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking,
48 Ark. L. Rev. 161, 196 (1994)). Scholars have expressed significant doubts regarding
whether presidential elections can be meaningful devices for voters to hold agencies accounta-
ble for particular agency decisions. E.g., Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking
Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 441, 459 (2010); Nina A. Men-
delson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557, 563–64 (2003); see also Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible
Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L.
357, 383 (2010).
297. Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rational-
ity, and Reasons, 61 Duke L.J. 1811, 1821 (2012) (“[M]aking the administrative decisionmak-
ing process more transparent [makes it] more amenable to congressional oversight.”).
Congressional oversight has been conceptualized as a representative mechanism of holding
agencies accountable to the “popular will,” and alternatively as a means of prompting public
deliberation on an issue before an agency. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to
Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 9–10 (1994)
(“[C]ongressional monitoring and after-the-fact restraints provide an important check on
agency decision-making [despite] some shortcomings.”).
298. Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 Emory L.J. 369, 420 (2009)
(“[O]versight . . . ignores arbitrary decisionmaking by . . . agencies that escape[ ] the attention
of well-organized interest groups.”); see also Mendelson, supra note 215, at 1355 & n.57 (dis-
cussing the unrepresentative submajorities problem); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and
the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1994) (noting that monitoring
and reporting may reveal an agency’s actions but might not necessarily prompt any change).
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American Petroleum Institute was reportedly obstructed in its efforts when
the API told staff that the IBR standard was available—for a price of
$1,195.299 Again, although the standard was not secret, the price demanded
was a significant obstacle to access.
Similarly, to the extent that ordinary citizens, small entities, or outside
groups wish to appeal to the OIRA, which reviews all significant agency
rules pursuant to the Executive Order on Regulatory Planning and Re-
view,300 they must have ready public access to the content of the rules.
Finally, ready public access is also important for any entity to hold an
agency accountable in the courts through judicial review. Both regulated
entities and regulatory beneficiaries with sufficiently concrete interests to
satisfy standing requirements can generally invoke judicial review of regula-
tory standards under the APA.301 In that review, courts can assess whether
regulatory standards are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the agency’s
authorizing statute or any other law.302
Again, that these rules are not formally secret is beside the point. The
obstacles to accessing the text of the rules undermine the effectiveness of all
these accountability mechanisms. Both regulated entities and regulatory
beneficiaries must be able to readily learn what the standards say.303 As the
comments filed to the OFR suggest, the ordinary consumer, neighborhood
resident, or even small business owner cannot afford $60 for a single stan-
dard or hundreds of dollars for a membership fee to participate in develop-
ing standards or even simply to read them. Travel costs to Washington, D.C.,
are likely to be comparable to or greater than access fees for most people.
Even without access fees, an affected or interested person would already have
299. Comment of David Halperin, Of Counsel, and Carl Malamud, President &
Founder, Public.Resource.Org. 14 (OFR Docket Apr. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Comment of Pub-
lic.Resource.Org], available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=090000
6480feda5e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. Even though the API relented and
agreed to supply the standard free of charge, Congress then enacted a provision in the Pipeline
Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, § 24, 125 Stat.
1904, 1919 (2012) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 60102(p)), prohibiting pipeline safety guide-
lines or regulations from incorporating by reference any material that is not made available to
the public free of charge. Comment of Public.Resource.Org, supra, at 14; see also Strauss, supra
note 2, at 508 n.69.
300. Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
301. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Mashaw, supra note 227, at 120 (describing a “legal
public accountability regime” as one of three main devices for public governance accountabil-
ity regimes).
302. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
303. E.g., Shkabatur, supra note 230, at 84 (noting that transparency can be a “neces-
sary, but insufficient, requirement for public accountability”); see also Mashaw, supra note 227,
at 129 (discussing “transparent and regularized procedures which even outsiders can know
and appeal to in seeking to trigger accountability processes”).
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to spend significant time acquiring information about governmental stan-
dards and preparing comments or attempting to invoke other means of ac-
countability.304 One consequence of these demands on potential participants
is that business groups already disproportionately participate in the agency
rulemaking process.305 That these standards are both difficult to locate and
costly substantially undermines the usability of accountability mechanisms
for ordinary people.
3. The Distinctive Burdens Imposed by Access Prices for IBR Rules
One could raise a number of objections. Perhaps individuals are not
beating down the doors of SDOs to read these standards. Then greater pub-
lic access would not increase accountability. Numerous public comments
filed to the OFR in 2012 on incorporation by reference, however, came from
concerned individuals and small businesses seeking to read the standards.306
Owing to the challenges of locating IBR material on websites and the cost of
access, the number of individual requests SDOs have received for these stan-
dards and the number of challenges to the standards almost certainly under-
state the amount of public interest in reading them. Further, the OFR is
proposing to eliminate regulatory restrictions, beyond reducing the volume
of the Federal Register, on the sort of private standards an agency can incor-
porate by reference. This is likely to increase the number of rules of general
public interest that are incorporated by reference.
Moreover, it could be said of any form of governmental disclosure to the
public, including congressional statutes, that only a few people are interested
in the details. Inevitably, individuals vary in the level of “personal impor-
tance they attach to their attitudes on public policy issues.”307 Professor
Krosnick’s study of citizen attitudes on high-salience issues identifies the
presence of so-called “issue publics.” Only “relatively small groups of citi-
zens” may find a given issue to be of an “extremely high level[ ] of impor-
tance”; the rest may be comparatively disengaged.308 But as his study
suggests, it is not that “most citizens are without many policy preferences”
304. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Response, Should Mass Comments Count?, 2 Mich. J.
Envtl. & Admin. L. 173, 177 (2012).
305. See, e.g., Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking 188 (2d ed. 1999); Wagner, Admin-
istrative Law, supra note 231, at 1386; Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias To-
wards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. Pol. 128, 133
(2006).
306. See, e.g., Comment of A Concerned Citizen, supra note 195; Comment of Penza
Bailey Architects, supra note 78; Comment of Robert Tess, supra note 79.
307. Jon A. Krosnick, Government Policy and Citizen Passion: A Study of Issue Publics in
Contemporary America, 12 Pol. Behav. 59, 60 (1990), available at http://www.stanford.edu/
dept/communication/faculty/krosnick/docs/1990/1990%20government%20policy%20and%20
citizen%20passion.pdf.
308. Id. at 61.
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but rather that interests vary within the population, and many small minori-
ties may hold significant policy attitudes to which politicians respond.309
Thus, even if not every citizen may be concerned with a particular safety
standard, meaningful public access allows these smaller groups to engage,
increasing governmental accountability.
It would also be no answer to say that even with access fees, SDO rules
remain accessible to a few—those who can afford them or who can travel to
Washington, D.C. This is because the access limitations are not random;
they systematically exclude people based on budgetary constraints. For many
of these rules, budgetary constraints will likely be connected with the sub-
stantive interests under the rule. For example, consumers are generally likely
to have smaller budgets than manufacturers. A financial barrier to accessing
product safety standards thus is likely to distinctively and systematically dis-
advantage consumer interests. Neighbors to a pipeline are also likely to have
smaller budgets than pipeline operators. Even if all relevant legal standards
are free to the public, the pipeline operator would have an advantage, com-
pared with neighbors and consumers, in participating in SDO and agency
procedures, in obtaining expert and legal technical assistance to challenge
standards, and in holding agencies accountable for the standards they select.
But the access costs worsen this imbalance since they may keep many con-
sumers and neighbors from even getting in the door.
One could also object that addressing SDO access fees is unnecessary
since they hardly represent the only obstacle to an interested citizen’s ability
to understand the law or enforce her legal rights. Again, financial resources
can indisputably matter to an individual’s ability to effectuate her legal
rights. In litigation, for example, representation by counsel can often affect
the outcome.310 Substantial numbers of individuals with legal issues ranging
from child custody to potential deportation to foreclosure lack resources and
access to low-cost legal services and are thus compelled to represent them-
selves, generally to their detriment.311 Relatedly, some have commented that
incorporated standards tend to be “technical” and thus are not likely to be
accessible without outside expertise.
We might further group these objections into two points. First, an indi-
vidual may need resources to understand the contents of a (possibly techni-
cal) standard. That expertise may not come cheap. Second, an individual
309. See id. at 83. Krosnick found evidence to suggest that these strong interests are not
necessarily only held by the highly educated. Id. at 77.
310. See, e.g., Editorial, For Want of a Good Lawyer: Deportation Without Representation,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 2011, at SR14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/opinion/
sunday/deportation-without-representation.html (“[In deportation cases,] [a]bout 67 percent
of those with lawyers during the period reviewed were allowed to stay, while only 8 percent of
those without counsel avoided deportation.”).
311. Id.; Ethan Bronner, Right to Lawyer Can Be Empty Promise for Poor, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/us/16gideon.html?page-
wanted=all. But see Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333–34 (1985)
(noting, in nonadversarial veterans’ benefits proceedings, “no . . . great disparity” between
outcomes when claimants were represented by attorneys and other cases).
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may need resources to invoke any useful mechanism making practical use of
the contents, once she understands them. Thus, even if access to the con-
tents of the law were free and widespread, an individual reading regulatory
standards could still face significant financial obstacles to fully utilizing the
information. Given each of these resource demands, perhaps we might view
the access prices charged—whether $50 or $300—as inconsequential. Mean-
while, at the other end of the continuum, large corporations charged with
compliance or even large nonprofits with significant resources might also
find access costs trivial.
Concededly, the individual looking at “technical” standards might need
expertise to understand the text, including legal or scientific expertise. Stan-
dards incorporating testing protocols for environmental performance
properties of insulation for wire and cable,312 as with published federal rules
on measuring lead in gasoline,313 may simply state a technical professional
consensus on testing approaches. Such standards may be inaccessible to even
the college-educated, unless the reader possesses advanced training in chem-
istry or physics. To the extent that the reader lacks relevant knowledge, hir-
ing an expert may be costly.
But some members of the public will have relevant expertise, as the
comments filed to the OFR demonstrate. And as Krosnick’s work suggests,
the strong interest of even a relatively small group of individuals may
prompt policymakers to carefully consider their decisions. Certainly, we
should put aside the argument that these standards are not of interest to the
public at large.314 So-called “technical” standards often function to define
substantive policy, making them highly likely to be of broader interest even
if standards that are truly definitional might be of less interest.315 The ANSI
standard on “[b]iometric data interchange formats,”316 incorporated into
federal requirements for driver’s licenses, may sound technical in the collo-
quial sense, but the type of biometric data the government collects has gen-
erally raised concerns with privacy advocates.317 At $199, however, its price
312. E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1755.390(a)(7) (2013) (incorporating ASTM D 4566-90, “Standard
Test Methods for Electrical Performance Properties of Insulations and Jackets for Telecommu-
nications Wire and Cable”).
313. E.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 80, app. B (2012) (covering methods for determining total lead
content in gasoline, including dilution, stabilization, calibration, and calculation procedures).
314. See Bremer, supra note 10, at 147 n.65.
315. Even the NTTAA’s definition of “technical standards,” which does not in any way
constrain agency incorporation of private material, stretches broadly to include standards with
policy and values components: the standards are defined to mean “performance-based or de-
sign-specific technical specifications and related management systems practices.” National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 § 12(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 272 note (2012)
(Utilization of Consensus Technical Standards by Federal Agencies).
316. eStandards Store: ISO/IEC 19794-5:2005, Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., available for
sale at http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=ISO%2fIEC+19794-5%3a2005 (last vis-
ited Nov. 13, 2013), incorporated by reference in 6 C.F.R. § 37.17(e)(1) (2013).
317. See, e.g., Samir Nanavati et al., Biometrics (2002); Mark G. Milone, Biometric
Surveillance: Searching for Identity, 57 Bus. Law. 497 (2001); see also Tim Bu¨the and Walter
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makes it accessible only to a few.318 Moreover, many standards, such as
OSHA’s incorporation of ANSI safety standards for ladders, are expressly
aimed at achieving policy goals.319 Still more of the “technical” incorporated
standards clearly have the effect of defining substantive policy, as with the
use of private pharmaceutical compendia to define the extent of Medicare
coverage for off-label uses of prescription drugs.320
Many such rules may not even be “technical” in the sense that they
require advanced training or expertise to comprehend. Agencies incorporate
plenty of material that is phrased in ordinary language. The API’s standard
for public awareness in the event of a pipeline spill is an obvious example,
phrased (as it should be) in terms equally comprehensible to pipeline opera-
tors, first responders, and community members.321 The ASTM standards for
bicycle helmet safety, incorporated by reference into CPSC helmet safety
standards, are also accessible; they provide, for example, that helmets are to
be “dropped onto [a] flat anvil from a theoretical drop height of 2 m.”322
Nor do agencies appear particularly limited in their ability to incorporate
nontechnical standards, as noted. In fact, Circular No. A-119 encourages
agencies to adopt voluntary standards in large part because they may re-
present a “consensus.”323
In short, many of these standards are substantive and may not even be
technical in the colloquial sense. Further, the OFR, as noted, is expressly
proposing to expand the use of IBR standards to address nontechnical mat-
ters by eliminating the current regulatory requirement that an IBR rule con-
sist of “data, criteria, standards, specifications, techniques, illustrations, or
similar material.”324 This requirement has been commonly understood to
mean that IBR standards must be “technical,” although the term “standards”
clearly sweeps more broadly. For example, using current rules, the OFR has
Mattli, The New Global Rulers 224 (2011) (noting that consumers are outsiders in global
standards discussions).
318. See eStandards Store: ISO/IEC 19794-5:2005, supra note 316.
319. See 29 C.F.R. § 1915.72(a)(6) (2013) (“Manufactured portable wood ladders pro-
vided by the employer shall be in accordance with the provisions of ANSI Standard A14.1-
1975 . . . .”). This standard does not appear to be available on the ANSI website in any event,
having apparently been superseded by a 2007 version that seeks to ensure “safety under nor-
mal conditions of usage.” eStandards Store: ANSI ASC A14.1-2007, Am. Nat’l Standards
Inst., http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=ANSI+ASC+A14.1-2007#.UTptMlc2G1g
(last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
320. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 22, 30 and accompanying text.
322. See ASTM Int’l, ASTM F1447-93: Protective Headgear Used in Bicycling
§ 4.2 (1993), available at http://www.astm.org/READINGLIBRARY/VIEW/F1447-93.html (in-
corporated by reference into 16 C.F.R. § 1203.53(a)(2) (2013)).
323. Circular No. A-119, supra note 60, para. 3 (defining “standard” expressly to
include “processes and production methods, and related management systems practices . . .
specification of dimensions, materials, performance, designs or operations” and expressly ex-
cluding only “standards of personal conduct” and “[i]nstitutional codes of ethics”).
324. See 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a)(2) (2013) (current law); Incorporation by Reference, 78 Fed.
Reg. 60,784, 60,797 (revision to same, proposed Oct. 2, 2013).
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approved incorporation of public awareness requirements for pipeline oper-
ation. And finally, the evidence to date confirms that individual citizens are
interested in reading current standards, undeterred by their purportedly
technical quality.325
The second objection is that, given other financial obstacles (such as
attorney’s fees) associated with invoking legal rights, access costs are again
unlikely to be consequential. This objection would appear to have the most
force if a reader of the standard were to affirmatively seek judicial review
challenging an incorporated rule.326 There, expensive attorney representa-
tion, while not formally required, is likely to be useful. But individuals do
proceed pro se or with low-cost or pro bono counsel. As one comment filed
by Vermont Legal Services indicates, when an affected individual proceeds in
this manner, access costs to the relevant standards can prove to be an insu-
perable barrier.327
In addition, affirmative litigation or claim filing is only one of several
actions that a reader of an IBR standard might wish to take. As to the others,
access costs alone are likely a significant barrier. First, people may simply
wish to know what they need to do to comply with the law. The complaint
from truckers, for example, is not that they cannot understand the applica-
ble incorporated standards; it is that they must pay to access them.328 Related
complaints have been made on behalf of smaller companies that manufac-
ture airplane parts.329 Even if regulated individuals or entities might have a
due process defense to an enforcement action because the standards were
not affordable, defending against an enforcement action itself likely requires
costly legal services, putting a premium on compliance.
For consumers and beneficiaries of entitlements who want to make
more informed decisions on which products to buy, which communities to
live in, or which medical services to select to ensure Medicare coverage, ac-
cess, rather than expertise, again is the key issue. Both the cost of access and
the difficulty of locating standards can represent distinctive obstacles.
Finally, individuals have other tools besides litigation for holding the
government accountable. Ordinary individuals can and do readily write to
members of Congress regarding agency action or file comments directly
with agencies. Individuals file many thousands of comments on proposed
325. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
326. Some statutes also authorize citizen suits to enforce rules—as to these, again, at-
torney assistance is likely to be valuable. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006) (authorizing citizens to
commence a civil action against any person alleging violation of an effluent standard or limita-
tion under the Clean Water Act).
327. See Comment of Vermont Legal Aid, supra note 34.
328. See supra text accompanying note 81.
329. See Comment of the Modification & Replacement Parts Ass’n, supra note 19, at 4
(“The burden of paying high costs simply to know the requirements of regulations may have
the effect of driving small businesses and competitors out of the market, or worse endanger
the safety of the flying public by making adherence to regulations more difficult due to fees
. . . .”).
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federal agency rules through http://www.regulations.gov every year.330 Again,
the critical issue here is access. Thus, the charging of access costs represents a
distinctive—not simply an incremental—impediment to public participa-
tion in agency decisionmaking and to registering views with Congress.
4. Expressive Harm Imposed by Access Fees
Having to pay a fee to read the law can obstruct individuals from learn-
ing their obligations, making informed decisions, or seeking governmental
accountability. But even if the incremental costs of access are relatively mini-
mal in some settings, the government’s decision to regulate by incorporating
expensive, difficult-to-locate standards also sends a damaging message to the
public.
We have a long and constitutive history of free and widespread public
access to federal laws.331 Indeed, it might be likened to our history of up-
holding free access to elections.332 In that setting, the Supreme Court has
invalidated poll taxes that might seem trivial compared with the costs of
traveling to the polls or taking time off work to vote. The Court has stated
that “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process.”333
Similarly, incorporating standards into law that are generally available
only after paying a significant fee set by a private entity or traveling to Wash-
ington, D.C., contrasts starkly with the strong American tradition of making
statutes and regulations freely and widely available. The depository library
system and, more recently, the internet have consistently provided that free
access.334 There are approximately 1,200 depository libraries nationwide.335
By contrast, IBR rules are not only costly for citizens to access but also
more difficult to locate than other binding law, since outside the OFR’s
Washington, D.C., reading room, numerous SDOs control access to the
thousands of incorporated standards. Moreover, as Professor Coglianese has
written, citizens now use “websites as their primary point of contact with
330. See generally Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present,
and Future, 55 Duke L.J. 943 (2006) (discussing rulemaking participation trends); Cynthia R.
Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That Counts,
2 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 123, 126–29 (2012) (same).
331. E.g., Comment of Cary Coglianese, Edward B. Shils Professor of Law, Univ. of
Penn. Law Sch. 1 (OFR Docket May 30, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/content
Streamer?objectId=0900006481022904&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (“The
ability of members of the public to read and understand the rules imposed by their govern-
ment has long been a hallmark of democracy. Accordingly, both Congress and every President
over the last twenty years have adopted laws, policies, or initiatives directing agencies to make
regulatory and other information more readily available to the public on the internet.”).
332. U.S. Const. amend. XXIV, § 2.
333. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–68 (1966) (invalidating a state
$1.50 poll tax as violating equal protection and as effective denial of the right to vote).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 159–180.
335. See FLDP for Public, U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/libraries/
public (last visited Nov. 13, 2013); see also Nat’l Acad. of Pub. Admin., supra note 172.
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their government, [so] even seemingly small and subtle barriers that inhibit
fair public access to government information take on significance.”336 If any-
thing, the significance of sharply reduced access to SDO standards has been
heightened by recent presidential statements increasing the government’s
stated commitment to transparency, including acknowledgments that
“[o]penness will strengthen our democracy,” and, as noted, that “trans-
parency promotes accountability.”337
The use of IBR rules sends citizens a set of messages that are profoundly
inconsistent not only with our other practices and with presidential state-
ments but also with core assumptions of a democratic government. The ob-
stacles, including the expense, of accessing IBR standards are “hostile in
[their] essence” to the notion that a democratic government must govern
publicly.338 Most obviously, for citizens to participate in the electoral process
and in public discussion on political matters, they must be able to readily
learn what the government is doing. IBR rules are not secret. But by making
access expensive, difficult, or both for ordinary citizens, agencies are sending
the message that the democratic process is beside the point for this set of
quasi-legislative rules. Instead, the message is that the government mainly
needs to be accountable to individuals and businesses of means.339
Moreover, when private organizations largely control access to the law,
including the apparent power to curtail access to the text, this category of
law, unlike federal statutes, other federal regulations, and federal court opin-
ions, does not appear to be under public control.340 This, in turn, may
prompt broader concern that agency policies are not necessarily chosen to
serve the public interest. This cluster of messages is likely to feed public
cynicism regarding governmental functions and the meaningfulness of vot-
ing and public participation, reducing civic engagement and the perceived
legitimacy of government.341
336. See Comment of Cary Coglianese, supra note 331, at 1–2.
337. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, supra note 185, at 1.
338. Cf. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A Gen-
eral Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1554 (2000) (quoting Donald Regan, The Supreme
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L.
Rev. 1091, 1113 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
339. Cf. Adam Liptak, Seeking Justice? Try the Courtroom, Not the Line Outside, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 16, 2013, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/supreme-
court-spectator-line-acts-as-a-toll-booth.html (quoting Harvard professor Michael Sandel that
permitting line-standing companies to sell seats in the Supreme Court “is yet another instance
of letting money dominate democracy . . . at odds with equal access”).
340. This situation differs significantly from legal research services such as those pro-
vided by Westlaw and Lexis. While these search and indexing services are surely valuable, the
content of legal statutes, regulations, and court opinions remains readily accessible online for
free. E.g., Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, supra note 8 (“No fee is charged for access to
judicial opinions.”).
341. See, e.g., Comment of Laura Breyers 1 (OFR Docket Mar. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480fdc436&disposition=at-
tachment&contentType=pdf (“There’s parts of the law that are owned by private corporations?
Really? Well, if that’s ok with you, then let’s just go ahead and privatize the court system . . . .
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The presence of this expressive harm ought to matter in the institutions
considering reform of agency use of IBR rules, whether in the OFR, the
OMB, or Congress. Some have similarly argued that charging access fees for
the court filings collected by “Public Access to Court Electronic Records”
(“PACER”), the federal courts’ information system, have interfered in im-
portant ways with citizen access to the way the government operates, al-
though PACER does not charge for judicial opinions.342
Expressive harm may also matter for constitutional arguments around
incorporation by reference practices. As Professors Anderson and Pildes ar-
gue in the voting rights setting, courts have invalidated so-called “racial re-
districting” not because the new districts actually dilute voting power but
instead because “certain districts convey the message that political identity
is, or should be, predominantly racial.”343
In the IBR setting, one could argue, for example, that even if only some
citizens are effectively prevented from reading IBR standards, agencies are
expressing a view that is fundamentally inconsistent with the First Amend-
ment’s core value of free discussion of governmental affairs.344 This value in
turn underlies the “right of the people to choose” governmental officials,
directly or indirectly, in the electoral process.345 Indeed, these barriers to
accessing IBR rules raise First Amendment issues.346
In fact why do we need the government at all, wal-mart seems to be really efficient at what
they do, lets [sic] have them run things.”); cf. Farina et al., supra note 330, at 150–51 (noting
the “value of individual and group participation in public policymaking processes” and com-
menting that encouraging participation that agencies will not value is “peddling democratic
snake oil”).
342. E.g., John Schwartz, An Effort to Upgrade a Court Archive System to Free and Easy,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/
13records.html. As noted, however, PACER imposes no charge for accessing the most impor-
tant documents issued by the judicial branch—opinions that decide the cases.
343. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 338, at 1539; see also id. at 1543 (noting that Su-
preme Court decisions after Brown v. Board of Education held segregation unconstitutional
without examining specific cultural or psychological effects).
344. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“[S]peech on public issues occu-
pies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”) (quoting Connick v. My-
ers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
345. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941) (“The right of the people to
choose . . . is a right established and guaranteed by the Constitution . . . .”).
346. At some point, the payment restrictions that the OFR has permitted for incorpo-
rated material may affect First Amendment values, since the public cannot become informed
of or criticize government actions if the public does not know—or cannot readily learn—what
they are. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (“[A] major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)); Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892 (9th Cir.
2012) (“[A] court cannot rubber-stamp an access restriction simply because the government
says it is necessary. By reporting about the government, the media are ‘surrogates for the
public.’ ”) (requiring consideration of public right of access to view Bureau of Land Manage-
ment horse roundups); cf. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–68 (1966) (invali-
dating state $1.50 poll tax as effective denial of right to vote); Gitto v. Worcester Telegram &
Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Global Corp.), 422 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that only the
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By using IBR rules, one could also understand the government as com-
municating a message that is inconsistent with notions of equal protection
and equal access to the government. Similarly, standing as a candidate can
obviously require significant resources, whether it is the cost of broadcast
advertising or the resources to take time off to campaign. A filing fee of a
few hundred dollars thus might appear trivial by comparison, but courts
have nonetheless consistently invalidated these fees as violating equal protec-
tion, given “our tradition . . . of hospitality toward all candidates without
regard to their economic status.”347 By the same token, agency incorporation
of private standards that the ordinary citizen can only access with significant
cost, difficulty, or both is inconsistent with the idea that every citizen should
have ready access to the law, whatever her economic status.
5. Loss of Benefits for Regulatory Development
Lastly, the free availability of laws and regulations generally benefits the
ongoing development of regulatory standards. Future law drafters, whether
in Congress, agencies, or private organizations, can learn from the innova-
tions of earlier standards and their successes or failures. Innovations in regu-
latory design have led to a preference for performance standards over design
standards, as well as an increased use of information-disclosure standards
and so-called “nudging” standards that take advantage of behaviorist in-
sights.348 Greater public disclosure of SDO-developed standards would un-
doubtedly increase the opportunity for these sorts of innovations.349
most compelling reasons can justify nondisclosure of judicial records). An agency interpreta-
tion that runs close to a constitutional line must be clearly authorized by Congress. E.g., Solid
Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (“Where an administra-
tive interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear
indication that Congress intended that result.”).
347. E.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 710, 717–18 (1974) (striking down as violative of
equal protection a $701 filing fee requirement for California county supervisor election); see
also Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (“[A] State violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . whenever it
makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”).
348. E.g., Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 Yale J. on
Reg. 91, 108 n.114 (noting use, in the Dodd–Frank Act, of mechanisms to assess consumer
responses to particular sorts of disclosure); Michael S. Barr, An Inclusive, Progressive National
Savings and Financial Services Policy, 1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 161, 174 (2007) (noting that
“behavioral economics suggests that consumers will underestimate how much they will bor-
row and overestimate their ability to pay their bills in a timely manner,” a characteristic ex-
ploited by credit card companies). See generally Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein,
Nudge (2008) (suggesting that behavioral research insights can usefully inform regulatory
choices); William F. Pederson, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes and
Beyond, 25 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 151 (2001).
349. See also Cunningham, supra note 45, at 311–12 (noting copyright’s concern with
“incremental improvement through derivative works”; “[a]ll standards embodied in law would
be subject to improvement through free rights to derivative creation”).
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Technical standards that are open to the public can prompt technological
innovation as well.350
In February 2013, similar considerations led the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy to announce a policy of making federally
funded research freely available to the public within twelve months of its
publication, even though this would have the effect of reducing revenues to
the private publishers of that research. Although this research was not secret,
the White House policy change recognized that the publication charges rep-
resented a significant obstacle to public access. Metadata was to be available
without charge upon first publication. As the Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy commented, the results of such scientific research “become the
grist for new insights.”351
III. Permissible Reform Measures
What should be done about IBR standards? Given a fuller understand-
ing of the reasons why law must be readily available to the public, reform of
IBR standards is clearly required. The fees that SDOs charge block ready
public access and disproportionately affect those of more limited means,
particularly individuals and small businesses. Affected individuals receive
less notice of and benefit from the laws. The access limitations also affect the
ability of these individuals to participate in the process of regulatory devel-
opment and to hold agencies or SDOs accountable for the content of the
standards. Again, these obstacles to access are not random, instead dis-
advantaging the less wealthy. And although persons seeking to understand
or enforce their legal rights may, as a practical matter, also bear other costs,
an agency’s decision to incorporate difficult-to-locate, expensive standards
sends a message that is sharply inconsistent with our democratic
commitments.
A more complete analysis of the public access question strengthens the
case for reform of the IBR system. It further suggests that not all the reform
options considered so far, whether legislatively or administratively, should
be on the table.352 Any further legislative or administrative action on agency
use of incorporated private standards should ensure permanent, widespread
public availability of those standards. At a minimum, full access is needed to
350. See Comment of Daniel Trebbien 1–2 (OFR Docket May 29, 2012), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648101ebc6&disposition=at-
tachment&contentType=pdf.
351. See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Dir., Exec. Office of the President, Office
of Sci. & Tech. Policy, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Increasing Access
to the Results of Federally Funded Scientific Research 1 (Feb. 22, 2013), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ostp_public_access_memo_2013.pdf.
352. As noted, legislative reform may be possible, as in the limited context of pipeline
safety, and the OFR is, at the time of writing, conducting a rulemaking on IBR. See supra text
accompanying notes 41–44.
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ensure that all interested parties, including both regulated entities and regu-
latory beneficiaries, have appropriate notice of their legal liabilities and enti-
tlements. And any reform should provide citizens with assured ready access
during the entire period the SDO rule has been incorporated into federal
regulatory law.353 That access ought to be provided in a centralized location
that is easy for individuals to find. Such centralized access must be freely
available through governmental depository libraries. Library access to hard
copies could also be provided, although it seems likely that most members of
the public now rely on digital access.354 Ideally, reform would provide access
to IBR rules through text or direct links on the Government Printing Office
and Federal Register websites, and additionally through federal agency web-
sites.355 Access should be through federally controlled websites to address a
second critical barrier to public access—the current difficulty of locating
IBR standards distributed over many different SDO websites.356
Full digital access without charge, beyond what is available at govern-
mental depository libraries, would place access to IBR standards on the same
footing as other federal regulations. (This sort of access would not necessa-
rily preclude SDOs from selling books of standards, much as the Govern-
ment Printing Office continues to sell bound reference sets of the CFR.) The
current read-only access to these standards occasionally provided at the op-
tion of SDOs and on SDO websites is insufficient. The SDOs typically claim
the right to revoke this access at will, and no enforceable commitments as-
sure ongoing access.357
Nor is the OFR’s proposed rule adequate. It would not speak directly to
the level of public access required before language can be incorporated by
reference into federal agency rules without Federal Register publication. In-
stead, the OFR is suggesting that a federal agency proposing or finalizing a
rule with IBR material “[d]iscuss” the way the agency “worked to make the
materials . . . reasonably available to interested parties.”358 Because the rule
contemplates OFR approval of agency use of an IBR rule that is not, in fact,
“reasonably available,” as long as the agency discusses its efforts, it is insuffi-
cient to address the public access question.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 139–142.
354. Comment of ABA Admin. Law Section, supra note 39, at 11.
355. Bremer notes that some agencies do occasionally insist on this sort of access. Bre-
mer, supra note 10, at 179 & n.229.
356. For example, as discussed above, despite repeated efforts, I was unable to locate an
advertised free-access version of an ASTM standard that the CPSC was proposing to incorpo-
rate during the writing of this Article. See supra note 73.
357. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. As noted, a reader seeking to access
standards on a read-only basis on the websites where SDOs do provide them must often click
on a release both waiving any challenges to SDO copyright as well as acknowledging the SDOs’
full discretion to eliminate the provided access.
358. Incorporation by Reference, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,797 (revision to 1 C.F.R.
§ 51.5(a)(1), proposed Oct. 2, 2013). In addition, as discussed above, the proposed rule would
expressly broaden potential uses of IBR rules to include any rule that “[s]ubstantially reduces”
Federal Register volume. Id. (proposing revision to 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(a)(2)(ii)).
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Professor Cunningham suggests that an agency might have a number of
options to procure public access to private standards the agency has incor-
porated by reference, other than permitting the SDO to set access charges.359
For example, an agency could negotiate a license with an SDO to make IBR
standards readily available to the public through a link on the Federal Regis-
ter or CFR website. Although SDO standards clearly supply value in the
regulatory process,360 agencies should not need to pay “list price” to obtain
this type of ready public access to incorporated standards. The prices SDOs
currently charge for IBR standards are not “platonic” in any sense or even a
function of the cost of production. Federal agency incorporation by refer-
ence of an SDO standard unquestionably increases the demand for it and, in
turn, the likely income an SDO will receive.361 For example, no-longer-cur-
rent versions of SDO standards are sometimes priced higher than current
versions simply because a federal agency has elected to incorporate the older
one by reference.362 (The presence or absence of a valid SDO copyright in
incorporated standards may also affect the extent to which SDOs can charge
the public for access.)363 And SDOs are benefited in other ways by federal
incorporation of their standards, which may prompt them to make those
standards available at a lower price. Incorporation by reference may re-
present a form of “free advertising” for the publisher, for example.364 Even
for SDOs that identify as groups of experts, rather than industries, federal
incorporation by reference of an SDO standard is a point of pride for the
group.365 Particularly in groups where regulated entities are well represented,
the strong interest in influencing the content of the law may even motivate
an SDO to agree to read-only public access without further charge.366 As
359. E.g., Cunningham, supra note 45, at 338–41 (discussing compulsory licensing,
agency insistence on SDO provision of access, and other strategies).
360. SDOs have suggested that access charges represent compensation for the value
SDOs create in drafting standards. See, e.g., Comment of Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs 1 (OFR
Docket June 4, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900
00648102e32a&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (arguing that the phrase “reasona-
bly available” must balance public access interests with “the right of organizations . . . to
administer access to their intellectual property”).
361. See, e.g., supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (SDOs thus receive substantial
price-setting ability). As others have argued, this amounts to a sort of monopoly rent. See
Cunningham, supra note 45, at 335; Strauss, supra note 2, at 548 (noting that for older stan-
dards, the value to the SDO is simply from “the standard’s transformation into law”). As the
nonprofit Public.Resource.Org has urged, this system has resulted in SDO CEOs earning ex-
traordinarily high salaries. Comment of Public.Resource.Org, supra note 299, at 15.
362. E.g., Strauss, supra note 2, at 509–10 (citing an example of American Herbal Prod-
ucts Association’s Herbs of Commerce; the 1992 edition, incorporated by reference in FDA
rules, sells for $250; the updated 2000 edition is available for $99.99).
363. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
364. Comment of the Modification & Replacement Parts Ass’n, supra note 19, at 13.
365. Strauss, supra note 2, at 514 (“If the standard has been designed to become law,
the claim of the public to know it is strong, and the SDO is more likely to be disappointed if its
work is not converted into legal obligations than surprised if it is.”); id. at 515 (“Incorporation
would also confer satisfying prestige on the SDO . . . adding to the value of its other works.”).
366. See Comment of Chamber of Commerce, supra note 279, at 1.
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Cunningham writes, “Most organizations whose standards are embodied in
law seek [incorporation into federal rules] and should eagerly cooperate.”367
The fact that several SDOs have elected to make IBR standards available on a
read-only basis on their own websites following the petition to the OFR
supports the conclusion that agency negotiation of a price for incorporated
standards may not be tremendously difficult or expensive.368
In the case of an SDO that regularly supplies governmental standards,
such as the NAESB or the API, governmental contracting may also be an
option. Besides resolving in favor of the government the question of who
owns the copyright to material that ends up in federal rules,369 contracting
would have the salutary effect of permitting the agency to solicit bids to
supply standards, thus increasing competition among groups to do so and
enabling the agency to specify more open and accessible processes for stan-
dards development.370
For an SDO who is unwilling to sign such a contract or to negotiate to
provide public access as a condition of incorporation, a federal agency intent
on incorporating a publicly accessible standard would face a choice between
drafting a government-unique standard or using compulsory licensing pro-
visions (assuming the agency concludes that the SDO is asserting a valid
copyright claim), as Cunningham discusses.371 A federal agency could also
“take” the SDO standard and pay compensation that is established through
an adjudication process.372
What should be out of bounds? Any proposal that continues to rely
primarily on SDOs for public access, so that the SDOs can condition such
access on the payment of fees.373 Further, any reform must consider the
needs not only of regulated entities, including small businesses, but also reg-
ulatory beneficiaries, which can encompass large segments of the public at
large. Reforms must assure that groups currently underrepresented in
agency and SDO processes have access to the text of these rules—and thus
have a chance at participating in standards development and at invoking
mechanisms of accountability. Nor would it be sufficient to provide free
access only to limited groups. As one SDO stated in comments filed with the
OFR, “[T]he sphere of persons affected by an IBR standard can be very large
and at times difficult to accurately determine,” weighing in favor of a
367. Cunningham, supra note 45, at 342.
368. See supra text accompanying note 39 (describing petition). As of November 2013,
the API appears to have agreed to make free read-only access to at least one standard directly
from the Department of Transportation website. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., supra note 22.
369. See Rights in Data—General, 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-14(b) (2012) (providing as de-
fault rule that government has unlimited rights in data produced in performance of or deliv-
ered under a contract).
370. See also Strauss, supra note 2, at 544–45 (discussing “outsourcing”).
371. See Cunningham, supra note 45, at 332 (discussing compulsory licensing
arrangements).
372. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 546–47 (discussing “takings” claims and noting that
even a takings rationale would not typically justify allowing prior owners to charge the public).
373. See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 10, at 180–82.
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straightforward approach that provides free online access to the entire
public.374
While a small fee of, say, a couple of dollars, perhaps used to defray
web-hosting costs, might not prevent most individuals or small businesses
from reading standards, even a small fee could still represent a significant
financial obstacle to those in poverty or those who wished or needed to
access multiple standards. Moreover, an access charge, particularly if indi-
viduals were also compelled to resort to SDO websites to locate the stan-
dards, would still communicate a message of hostility to core democratic
values. Thus, these standards ought to be made available to the public in the
same manner as other federal regulatory standards—for free in governmen-
tal depository libraries and, ideally, through the Government Printing Office
and agency websites as well.
Finally, a note on so-called “safe harbor” standards. At least one scholar,
Professor Strauss, suggests that although IBR standards ought generally to
be made public, agencies might use SDO standards as an illustrative means
of compliance with more general federal regulatory requirements, so that
compliance with the SDO standard would serve as one means of satisfying
the federal requirement.375 This approach would be in lieu of mandating the
content of the SDO standards.376 SDOs could, in turn, defray their revenue
losses for some standards by continuing to charge for these “safe harbor”
standards.377
An analysis that takes full account of the needs of regulatory benefi-
ciaries for notice and for accountability, however, should make clear that
such “safe harbor” standards should be just as available to the public as any
other incorporated standard. Regulated entities may have a choice whether
to follow such standards. Because the standards bind agencies to consider
compliance with the standards as compliance with the law, however, the
standards effectively define the federal protections provided to regulatory
beneficiaries. For example, the CPSC’s bicycle helmet safety regulations pro-
vide that a helmet manufacturer’s compliance with any one of eight pri-
vately written standards will be deemed compliance with federal
requirements.378 The manufacturer’s choice of compliance standard would
define the extent of public protection. Moreover, a safe harbor may come to
“dominate other means of compliance” because of the ease of proving that
374. Comment of Ronald E. Jarnagin, President, ASHRAE 4 (OFR Docket Mar. 30,
2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480fe4f56&
disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing comments from building standards de-
velopment organization).
375. Strauss, supra note 2, at 549.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 551.
378. 16 C.F.R. § 1203.53(a) (2013).
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the standard has been satisfied.379 Because regulated entities and benefi-
ciaries both need notice of the standard and an opportunity to hold govern-
ment and SDOs accountable for it, “safe harbor” standards should be
subject to the same public access requirements as any other binding rule.
Conclusion: On Public Access
With the increasing reliance on IBR standards in federal rules, we are in
the process of creating a situation very similar to the one that Professor
Griswold complained about in 1934 and that prompted Congress to enact
the Federal Register Act.380 Regulations that impact “persons and property”
are published ad hoc in numerous locations and are hard to locate, even
when federal agencies provide SDO contact information in the CFR. And of
even greater concern, our access to these standards is primarily through pri-
vate organizations empowered to charge significant fees. Indeed, current ac-
cess might be compared unfavorably to the accessibility of edicts at the time
of Caligula. Then, a citizen could use a ladder and a magnifying device. With
IBR rules, moreover, the public’s access is not randomly impaired but is
instead impaired disproportionately based on income. Those with smaller
budgets, such as consumers, employees in hazardous workplaces, or small
businesses, are obviously and disproportionately affected.
So, why does the law need to be public? And what should “trans-
parency” mean in the setting of binding law? Assessing interests around IBR
standards yields a clearer sense of what underlies the deeply felt intuition
that law needs to be public. What is clear is that it is generally an insufficient
answer to say, as the OFR has recently stated with respect to IBR rules,
“[T]he government is not prohibiting access to the materials.”381
Public access to governmental decisions and governmental information
is not an on–off switch. At one end of the continuum, we might consider
genuinely “secret” documents, with security classifications, for which unau-
thorized public disclosure is prohibited and penalized. At the other, we
might consider documents that agencies affirmatively distribute online and
post in public places, specifically phrase in “plain language,” and even trans-
late into other languages. Transportation Security Administration brochures
and airport signs concerning traveling with liquids might be an example.
Such governmental statements not only provide information widely but seek
379. Comment of ABA Admin. Law Section, supra note 39, at 10; Tim Bu¨the and Wal-
ter Mattli, The New Global Rulers 17 (2011) (with respect to “voluntary” European
standards, “the effect of standards is direct and binding since the cost and difficulty of proving
equivalence are enormous”). 29 C.F.R. § 1910.135(b)(2) well illustrates this point. It provides
that “[h]ead protection devices that the employer demonstrates are at least as effective as head
protection devices that are constructed in accordance with one of the above consensus stan-
dards will be deemed to be in compliance. . . .” An employer wishing to use this option must
measure its performance against that of the private standard, an approach itself requiring
recourse to the private standard.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7, 166–167 (discussing Griswold’s
arguments).
381. Incorporation by Reference, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,787 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013).
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to minimize any obstacles to public comprehension of governmental actions
and requirements.382
For regulatory standards, one must assess the level of needed public ac-
cess with reference to the demands of public notice and governmental ac-
countability. In the modern age, notice needs to be broadly understood.
Access must be widely available to those who must conform their conduct.
And access must also be generally available to the intended beneficiaries of
legislation, such as consumer protection or environmental quality laws. In-
dividuals’ financial and personal interests may be impacted and their deci-
sions affected by the presence or absence of a governmental decision, even if
they are not directly subject to sanctions. Thus, that a law is not formally
secret is not sufficient for notice purposes. If those burdened with obliga-
tions cannot learn their substance without paying hundreds of dollars to an
SDO or traveling to Washington, D.C., the law is not meaningfully public.
The same sorts of burdens deny meaningful access to beneficiaries of the
law.
And to ensure accountability, we need at least as much—usually
greater—public access to quasi-legislative actions as to more narrowly fo-
cused decisions, where more process may be available. Legislative and quasi-
legislative actions are among the core actions of modern government, elec-
tions are critical for accountability, and a citizen’s ability to cast an informed
vote in a democracy depends on meaningful public access.
In the modern administrative state, partly in response to limited electo-
ral accountability, we have devised a range of accountability mechanisms to
ensure that an agency’s action is not an abuse of its authority, is consistent
with the law, and is properly democratically responsive. The need for public
access to rules, and to IBR rules specifically, has to be assessed in the context
of these evolving mechanisms of accountability. For agency rules in general,
public access must be sufficient to support a person’s ability to participate in
and seek revision of agency decisions and to demand that agencies account
for their actions through that process, through judicial review, and through
White House and congressional oversight. Thus, meaningful public access to
rules must denote widespread and free—or extremely low-cost—access. At a
minimum, this means the sort of free access currently provided over the
internet and at public and depository libraries.
And as administrative agencies and Congress increasingly experiment
with so-called “collaborative governance,” we must continue to actively con-
sider public access needs. In particular, we must consider what level of access
will ensure public accountability when, as with IBR rules, governmental in-
stitutions rely on the work of private ones. In such collaborative governance
efforts, the government must be accountable for ensuring that all the par-
ticipants have committed to public goals and that democratic norms are not
382. E.g., Transp. Sec. Admin., 3-1-1 for Carry-ons: Prepare for Take-off (n.d.),
available at http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/assets/pdf/311_brochure.pdf.
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“erode[d]”—as Freeman terms this aim, the “publicization” of the process,
including for participating private institutions.383
In particular, we must focus in detail on the dynamics between and
interactions among private entities, public agencies, other governmental in-
stitutions, and the public at large. By using SDO standards, agencies and the
public may gain from private sector creativity and expertise and save federal
resources. But as with governmental contracting and other outsourcing deci-
sions, the use of IBR rules raises important accountability challenges. These
challenges can include reliance on partially closed processes and decision-
making based on undisclosed data. Internal safeguards, such as an agency
selecting (or not) particular privately drafted rules as appropriate for use,
may not safeguard against poor standards that do not serve the public inter-
est. Public access may thus be critical to ensure that the remaining accounta-
bility mechanisms are fully functional.
In short, as we redesign our governance mechanisms, fuller, more
methodical attention to the public access needed for governmental account-
ability and notice is necessary. In the setting of IBR rules, the current system
is very far from providing adequate public access. Widespread free access to
the text of both proposed and final IBR rules, like that provided for agency-
drafted rules, is critical to assure that agencies have properly adopted IBR
rules and that those rules can be revised if need be.
Finally, we must consider the message the government sends by provid-
ing free access to IBR rules only in a Washington, D.C., reading room and
acquiescing in private entities’ charging significant fees for access. The mes-
sage is particularly striking at a time when Congress and the president have
taken numerous efforts to open governmental workings and to dramatically
increase digital access to governmental actions and information. Against the
backdrop of a history of free, open access to American law, the use of IBR
rules subject to significant restrictions—restrictions likely to preclude access
to most ordinary citizens—sends a message that undermines our core dem-
ocratic commitments to public governance and the idea of equal access to
the law.
Federal regulatory actions may not sound as worrisome as particular
surveillance decisions, but, as a group, they apply to the entire public—both
more broadly and for an indefinite duration. These legislative and quasi-
legislative actions are among the most significant powers exercised by the
federal government. Access to the text of these rules cannot just be a formal-
ity; the text must be readily, meaningfully available to the public, including
383. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Accountability Through Privatization: From
Public Law to Publicization, in Public Accountability: Dilemmas, Designs and Exper-
iences, supra note 227, at 83, 83–84.
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substantial levels of access without charge. Whether such increased trans-
parency in the form of meaningful public access will suffice for accountabil-
ity in this collaborative governance setting is unclear,384 but it is the bare
minimum.
384. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 217, at 58 (describing use of an additional layer
of private parties to oversee private accreditation of compliance with governmental standards
such as organic food standards).
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